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An exploration of the impact of overseas confl ict on 
community formation, engagements and relationships with 
UK institutions. 
Researchers and policy-makers have a limited understanding of the 
ways in which confl icts overseas are affecting communities in the UK, 
except when there are substantial fl ows of asylum seekers and migrants 
from confl ict regions. Yet globalisation has intensifi ed and changed the 
international connections of UK communities. This research studied 
the impact of confl ict on communities in the UK from three areas: 
Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Great Lakes region (Burundi, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda) and the western Balkans.
The report:
•  looks at why some communities are affected more by overseas 
confl ict than others;
•  examines six detailed case studies of communities affected 
by overseas confl ict;
•  assesses how different communities challenge assumptions 
of mainstream society about particular confl icts; and
•  considers the ways in which service providers at national  and 
local level can support communities affected by overseas confl ict. 
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5Executive summary
Although current patterns of globalisation may be traced back more than a century, two recent changes 
have affected the impact of overseas confl ict on UK communities. First, changes in communication 
technologies now allow direct access to information from a tremendously wide variety of sources, in real 
time. This ‘globalisation from below’ contrasts with previous stages of globalisation where such tools were 
concentrated in the hands of state institutions or multinational companies. Second, geopolitical changes, 
particularly since 1990, have resulted in a growing diversity of migrant groups arriving in the UK, frequently 
providing direct links to parts of the world undergoing confl ict. 
 Links between overseas confl ict and UK communities have received very little attention in the social 
sciences. The limited literature is focused on the potential for ethno-national diaspora communities in the 
UK to affect the conditions of confl ict elsewhere. This research has expanded and reversed this focus to 
consider how overseas confl ict affects a broad array of communities in the UK.
 The understanding of community is central to this research. Notions of ‘community’ were 
downplayed in public policy in the UK throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but the Cantle report of 2001 
marked a return to a language of community in public policy discourse. Yet there is limited conceptual 
clarity in the ways in which ‘community’ is used. There is particular confusion between the widespread 
usage of ‘community’ to refer both to local places and to ethno-national groups. 
 This report has distinguished between these two understandings of community, since public 
institutions must engage in different ways with each of them. The report uses the term ‘local communities’ 
to refer to place-based social groups. Rather than the common term ‘black and minority ethnic’ (BME) 
communities, this report uses the broader term ‘ethno-national communities’. This term also includes 
minority communities that do not self-identify as ‘black’ or ‘ethnic’, and the ‘majority’ ‘white British’ 
community. This report has also considered ‘communities of choice’, in this case used to describe civil 
society mobilisations around particular confl icts, and ‘communities of practice’, which refers to coalitions of 
professionals focused on an individual issue. 
 Research for this project has concentrated on the impact of three specifi c confl icts, selected to 
provide contrasting examples of UK involvement, geographical area and current intensity. These are: 
Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Great Lakes (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], Rwanda, Uganda) 
and the western Balkans. Following a mapping exercise to determine the extent of the links between these 
confl icts and the UK, six case studies were identifi ed to cover a broad cross section of the four types of 
communities considered earlier. Each of the six case studies was the focus of a separate sub-project 
involving 15–20 interviews and several focus groups. 
 The research identifi ed six important variables infl uencing the extent and nature of the impact of 
these confl icts on UK communities: 
• nature of UK involvement;
• proximity of confl ict to the UK; 
• timing and duration of the confl ict; 
• size and date of the arrival of diaspora communities in the UK; 
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• transnational engagement of diaspora; and
• media coverage. 
Local communities in London and Birmingham were involved in this research. Two important impacts on 
local communities were identifi ed as a result of confl ict. First, local communities evolve as a result of new 
entrants. Good practice examples of institutional responses involved the distribution of information to all 
those local services potentially involved in responding to new arrivals. Second, particular confl icts may alter 
the relationship between members of local communities and national institutions, such as the Birmingham 
neighbourhoods where the predominantly Pakistani population felt targeted by security responses to the 
confl ict in Pakistan. This is most likely to be the case where the UK is directly involved in the confl ict, either 
militarily or diplomatically.
 Communities of choice identifi ed in this research took the form of civil society organisations 
formed in response to confl ict, often with the aim of challenging the public characterisation of confl ict, as in 
the case of Help for Heroes, or as a way of challenging particular tendencies in UK national policy towards a 
confl ict region.
 Communities of practice can describe a wide range of activities, but in this case was used to 
describe networking of professionals responding to a particular impact of confl ict, here the arrival of 
signifi cant numbers of unaccompanied Afghan asylum-seeking children in two London boroughs, which 
had implications for health care, education, housing and foster care. The term ‘community of practice’ was 
coined in the early 1990s, but the idea did not really take off in the public sector in the UK until 2007. There 
seems to be considerable potential for developing such ad hoc professional coalitions in order to share 
information and develop policy approaches.
 Ethno-national communities were also infl uenced by the confl icts considered. This research 
identifi ed situations where interactions between different ethno-national communities from one particular 
confl ict area arose in the UK. One such interaction was between Kosovar Albanians, Bosniacs and 
Serbians. Given the post-confl ict changes in ethnic residential patterns in the former Yugoslavia, spaces for 
such exchanges have reduced there. 
 Religious organisations also have an important role to play. This research did not explicitly set out to 
examine the role of religious organisations. However, it found that, in some cases, they provide a relatively 
rare opportunity for individuals from a wide variety of other forms of community to come together. 
 The activities of the communities we considered focused most frequently on questions of 
perception and information. This includes challenging mainstream media representations of confl ict, which 
tend towards simplifi ed characterisations of confl ict based in antipathy between opposing sides. The 
opening of the Serbian section in Fulham library is a good example of a proactive information campaign 
resulting from engagement of the local Serbian ethno-national community. 
 Alternative sources of media provide one possible remedy to the limited information available in 
mainstream media. In some cases, this involves turning to media sources from foreign countries, 
which are increasingly widely available through the Internet. An alternative strategy is for community 
groups to develop particularly focused alternative information sources, by establishing specialist 
websites. Both of these strategies have the disadvantage that communication with broader public 
opinion in the UK is limited.
 Some community responses, particularly in the case of civil society-based communities of choice, 
involve direct challenges to public opinion through high-profi le events, such as the Help for Heroes concerts. 
 Community activities do not only focus on information. Community engagement activities also form 
an important part of responses to confl ict. These include:
•  a broad understanding of members of affected ethno-national communities (noted in the case of the 
outreach activities of Congolese associations targeting a broader francophone African constituency); or 
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•  explicit, information-sharing events (as in the case of the community of practice around unaccompanied 
Afghan asylum seekers).
In some cases, engagement with confl ict, and the circulation of information on confl ict, form part of the 
training for local service providers. This offers a valuable service but it could be enhanced, with limited 
effort, through increased publicity for existing sources of information (such as the regularly updated reports 
of the Country of Origin Information service of the UK Border Agency).
 The example of the community of practice identifi ed in this research is extremely positive and has 
brought together interested professionals, from a range of areas and relevant refugee community 
organisations, who would not necessarily have had the chance to meet otherwise. Currently, the 
professionals focused on a local community view the Afghan community organisations as being similarly 
grounded, although they often draw membership from a much wider fi eld, based on political or ethnic 
affi liation to sub-national groups in Afghanistan. This provides a clear example of the conceptual confusion 
around issues of community. 
 It is not only policy and practice at the local level that is affected by the impact of overseas confl ict. In 
many cases national government institutions are an important mediator of these impacts, particularly where 
the UK is directly involved in confl ict, as in the case of Afghanistan/Pakistan. So, in some cases, particular 
ministries have adapted to adjust legislation. Several national-level campaigns considered in this research 
engaged directly with national institutions. When making decisions, it is important for these national 
institutions to factor in the nature of likely impacts on local and ethno-national UK communities. Currently, 
there is little indication that this is the case. 
 The link between national and local level policy-making is becoming increasingly important. 
Its importance is likely to grow even more in view of the coalition government’s Big Society agenda. 
Responding sensitively to the impact of overseas confl ict requires a degree of expertise in the complexities 
of a wide variety of confl icts around the world. Such expertise is unlikely to be found in many local 
authorities or civil society organisations. There are two possible responses to this: 
• to draw on the expertise of individuals from areas facing confl ict; and 
• to diffuse expertise currently generated centrally, such as within the Foreign Offi ce and UK Border Agency.
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Understanding communities under global conditions 
In September 2010, the infl uential Pakistani politician Imran Farooq was murdered in Edgware, his home 
for the last eleven years. Despite his exile in the UK, Farooq had remained a signifi cant political fi gure in his 
home city of Karachi, and his murder was immediately linked to the repositioning of the Muttahida Qaumi 
Movement, the political party in which he was involved. Local police passed the matter on to the counter-
terrorism command who, they admitted, had ‘a much better knowledge of factional fi ghting in Pakistan’ 
(The Guardian, 17 September 2010). None of the widespread news coverage of Farooq’s death made 
particular note of the fact that political confl icts around the world could have such violent repercussions in a 
London suburb. 
 The UK – and particularly London, of course – has held a signifi cant position in many political 
struggles around the world for decades, if not centuries. Yet the signifi cant aspect of this event for wider 
society is the demand on local service providers, in this case the police, to have access to expertise about 
the complexities of Pakistani politics. Amongst the wide range of examples of transnational political impacts 
of overseas confl icts witnessed in the UK, Farooq’s death was unusual only in its violence. Overseas 
confl icts rarely have such violent implications for life in the UK. However, as this research argues, attention 
to overseas confl icts makes us think differently about a whole range of their more mundane impacts, not 
only on the lives of people, such as Farooq, who have come directly from confl ict affected areas but also on 
their families and the wider communities in which they live. 
 The idea of community is central to this research project. We are interested in how confl icts 
occurring around the world infl uence UK communities. One of the barriers to clarity in this research has 
been the variety of the sometimes confl icting meanings attached to the label ‘community’, which are 
further complicated by various related policy goals. It is widely recognised that globalisation has changed 
the way in which we should understand communities. New, often internationally dispersed, ‘communities’ 
are increasingly important for individual UK residents. This development is most strongly associated with 
intensifi ed post-colonial migration to the UK since the 1950s and the further diversifi cation of origins since 
the late 1990s, including the growth of migration from new European Union member states since 2004. 
This has produced a new ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec, 2007) most apparent in urban areas but undeniably 
touching the lives of individuals throughout the UK. 
 Policy interventions have struggled to account adequately for the signifi cance of these new forms 
of community. The offi cial policy line of multi-culturalism was gradually abandoned by New Labour, in the 
face of persistent social injustice, economic inequality and exclusion, and the recognition that different 
ethno-nationally defi ned ‘communities’1 were living ‘Parallel Lives’ – the title of Ted Cantle’s report (2001) 
– into the ethnically motivated violence in several northern towns in 2001. Multi-culturalism was replaced 
with policy objectives of ‘community cohesion’, allowing for a de-racialisation of the language of community 
engagement but heralding a return to ideas of integration (Worley, 2005). Sustained international links are 
now frequently viewed with suspicion, particularly when associated with regions of the world experiencing 
confl ict. Policy interventions such as the Prevent Strategy, described by the Daily Telegraph as ‘a text-book 
example of how to alienate just about everybody’ (Murray, 2010), illustrate how easily policy in this area can 
appear clumsy and insensitive. 
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Introduction
 A contributing factor to such policy confusion is a lack of clarity about the various forms 
communities can take and how community relations develop in these different contexts. Referring to 
‘community’ as a localised ‘place’ is commonly mixed with references to ethno-national communities – with 
no acknowledgement that this involves radically different understandings of the notion of ‘community’. This 
includes relatively high-profi le reports (e.g. CIC, 2007), and although much of this work refl ects detailed 
empirical research and solid theoretical frameworks, there is no engagement with the fundamental ideas. 
The lack of analysis of differences between local place-based communities and extensively networked 
social groups leads to mistaken impressions, in particular, those that relate to the internal homogeneity of 
ethno-national or religious communities; the frequently contested nature of membership or belonging; and 
the signifi cance of multiple affi liations.
 These debates have a long history, often traced to the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies’ 
1887 distinction between ‘community’ and ‘society’ or ‘association’ ([1887] 1963). Tönnies argued that 
‘community’ and ‘society’ represent the two normal types of human socialisation: 
1.  ‘Community’ as a closely knit, often kinship-based group rooted in shared values with long-lasting 
ties; and 
2. ‘Society’ as a more distant association, such as a business, based more on shared interests. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, when Tönnies was writing, elements of what we refer to today 
as ‘globalisation’ were already established, though mostly in the form of economic exchange. Mass 
transport and communication technologies were in their infancy. Although communication was possible 
over great distances, it was not suffi ciently rapid or democratised to support meaningful socialisation. 
Contacts associated with economic exchange (Tönnies’ ‘society’) could be maintained at a distance, but 
‘community’ maintenance and formation required physical proximity. 
 One of the effects of the intensifi cation of globalisation processes since then has been to overcome 
this requirement, so that communities can be maintained – and even formed – over great distances. It is 
only since the late 1970s that international air travel has been within reach of large numbers of people and, 
even then, only in the wealthiest countries, a trend that intensifi ed with the arrival of the new range of budget 
airlines in the 1990s. Relevant communication has become available even more recently, and it is only 
with the development of Web 2.0 and the spread of social networking sites such as Facebook (founded in 
2004), that intense, regular socialising has become possible without face-to-face meeting. It is still unclear 
if this type of ‘network sociality’ (cf. Wittel, 2001) can generate the same kinds of emotional support and 
feelings of belonging that are typically associated with ‘community’. This situation has created a vast array 
of research into the basic functions and constituent elements of ‘community’, often grounded in the notion 
of social capital. 
 Social capital is generally associated with the work of Robert Putnam (2000) who developed 
the concept to explain declining political participation in the USA. He considered that individuals forge 
and develop membership in networks and groups which, in turn, act as a resource for achieving social 
mobility. Such social networks are based on, and then generate, trust, civic engagement and reciprocity, 
and are based on shared values, creating potential for social cohesion. Perhaps for this reason Putnam’s 
concept has been very infl uential in the formation of policy goals on social cohesion and community 
relations, certainly in the UK. Putnam’s typology of how social capital is invested in, and shared within and 
across, networks has been particularly important in this context (Zetter, et al., 2006), namely: bonding 
(intra-community), bridging (across communities) and linking (community–public agency). There is often a 
tendency to idealise social networks and community solidarity, and downplay real dynamics and relations 
of power, whether within the same ‘communities’ or across minority and majority groups (Bourdieu, 1997). 
 Social cohesion, often expressed through social capital in policy agendas, has often been 
associated with proximity, while plural affi liations – especially linked to migrants – are seen as problems 
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to ‘be managed’ (Zetter, et al., 2006). The advent of ‘community cohesion’ in policy-making vocabulary 
in Britain takes this approach even further, implicitly attributing the diffi culties of modern life to the failed 
assimilation of new and settled immigrant communities (Crowley and Hickman, 2008). Community 
cohesion conceptualised in this way sits uncomfortably with multiple affi liations and belonging. Such 
multiple affi liations have been central to investigations of the ways in which migration and globalisation 
interact to form communities across borders (Castles, 2002). Although such transnational ties and 
interactions are not new, their frequency and durability over time and scale have only been observed in 
recent years, due to technological progress in telecommunications and transport. These products of post-
industrialism accelerate the speed and intensity with which global processes are translated at local level. 
 The constitution of ethno-national communities may be conceptualised in three different ways 
– each with implications for policy engagement:2 First, a ‘bottom up’ approach describes those groups 
that develop through self-identifi cation, such as highly localised home town associations or diaspora 
groups; second, a more ‘top down’ process is refl ected by divisions in statistical presentations that rarely 
refl ect genuine links between individuals, but affect policy development, such as the EU’s engagement 
with the 69 African, Caribbean and Pacifi c states; third, a combination of these two is apparent in 
attempts by individuals to develop services around these statistical categories as a way of engaging 
funding opportunities – in this research the efforts of a Congolese association to reach out to a broader 
francophone African constituency fall into this category.
 Some of these recent observations, highlighted by researchers, have begun to have an impact 
on policy discourse. For example, the fi nal report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC, 
2007) highlights the recent development of ‘super-diversity’ in the UK and refers to multiple identities 
based on gender, age, ethnic affi liation, social class or lifestyle choices in addition to membership of local 
communities. Yet although the language of ‘community’ refers to both ‘local communities’ and ‘ethnic 
communities’ this is not always clarifi ed. The focus seems to move back towards local communities, with 
the result that phrases such as ‘community premises’, ‘community tensions’, ‘community spirit’, ‘internal 
community bonding’ or ‘community engagement’ are, ultimately, ambiguous. 
 These developments have encouraged a renewed interest in the basis of notions of community in 
the social sciences. A substantial current of new research has focused on the nature of community and 
how communities form. It is increasingly common for individuals to have limited contacts in their immediate 
localities but to devote more time to ‘communities of choice’, which they actively select (Brint, 2001). 
Such communities contrast with the local communities based around particular localities of residence or 
work. The role of ethno-national communities in this simple division of communities, as in choice or place, 
is problematic. Any direct connection between ethno-nationally defi ned groups and particular places 
inevitably treats ethnicity as an unchangeable characteristic, whereas it is usually seen as constructed. 
For this reason the link has been criticised in particular approaches to diaspora (cf. Anthias, 1998). Rogers 
Brubaker (2005) considers membership of a diaspora as a choice which individuals make to emphasise the 
fl exible, self-identifi cation element of membership. Yet individuals are frequently classifi ed in ethno-national 
or religious terms in ways they have no control over, so ethno-national communities are not entirely a matter 
of choice – we consider them as a third manifestation of community. A fourth notion of community which 
we draw on in this research is that of ‘communities of practice’, a form of community of particular relevance 
to institutional actors and service providers, though it may extend well beyond professional groups of 
individuals (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 2006). The development of new communities of practice in 
the public service sector has been actively promoted by LG Improvement and Development since 2007 
(Local Government Group, 2010).
 We understand globalisation as a multi-faceted series of processes affecting all aspects of 
economic, political, cultural and social life. These conditions mean that all areas of the world are at 
least potentially interconnected (Held, et al., 1999). Some parts of the world have developed intense 
concentrations of global processes, particularly global cities, such as London, whereas elsewhere, 
including large parts of the UK outside of London, interconnections are not so well established. Political 
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economic studies of globalisation have linked these differential impacts with inequality and insecurity 
(Castles, 2003). Confl ict and its accompanying aspects such as forced migration, humanitarian action, or 
outsider military intervention are closely linked to this political economy of global change (Duffi eld, 2001; 
Kaldor, 2001; Richmond, 2002). Globalisation has also had an impact on the relationship between foreign 
and domestic policies, as foreign policy now relates to all government departments and local authorities are 
developing international links of their own (Briggs, 2010).
 This study considers the impact of confl ict on communities. Confl ict covers a broad range of political 
and military situations and while we focus on violent confl icts, violence is not always active or ongoing. 
Violent confl ict may be within or between states, though it is rare for confl icts to remain completely within 
the borders of a single state; in all three of the examples we focus on confl ict crossed borders, either 
from the outset or as the confl ict developed. Confl ict intersects the four forms of community considered 
earlier. There is a substantial literature on the transnational impact of confl ict that has been facilitated 
by globalisation, but the bulk of this work investigates the role of diaspora groups in exacerbating or 
ameliorating confl ict in their countries of origin (see Vertovec, 2006 for a summary), only very recently 
considering the impact of questions such as integration (Hall and Kostic, 2009). This investigation seeks to 
reverse this prevailing trend in the literature through an examination of the impacts of confl icts outside the 
UK on communities within the UK. We seek to combine the four ideas of community previously discussed: 
local communities, ethno-national communities, communities of choice and communities of practice, 
recognising that all individuals draw on important elements of all of these, yet all involve very different 
understandings of membership and communal interaction. The project approached this broader issue 
through the application of three key research questions: 
1. How do communities in the UK form or change under conditions of overseas confl ict?
2.  What are the types and impacts of interventions taken by various UK residents that relate to the 
overseas confl ict/politics?
3.  What is the impact of overseas confl ict/politics on relations between UK residents and UK institutions?
These questions structure the presentation of results in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
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Research focused on three confl icts as the ‘terrain’ of inquiry (Marcus, 1995). These case study confl icts 
were Afghanistan/Pakistan; the Great Lakes region, Africa; and the western Balkans, Europe.3 They were 
chosen to represent a range of geographical regions and levels of engagement by the UK government and 
society. The presence of ‘communities’ originating from these confl ict regions living in the UK was also a 
consideration. The three confl icts were also chosen to represent confl icts at different stages of evolution, 
from active confl ict to post-confl ict. In addition, they are confl icts in regions in which the research team has 
existing expertise. Table 1 summarises some features of the case studies.    
 The confl ict in Afghanistan (in which Pakistan is inextricably involved) has been ongoing for 
30 years. The UK’s current active military involvement is highly politically sensitive and, along with the 
confl ict in Iraq, has been integral to a wider questioning of relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim 
populations. Some British Muslims feel that they have been cast as an ‘enemy within’ and subjected to 
increased surveillance and control. 
 The Great Lakes region is an ongoing complex confl ict zone, which is mirrored in the diverse make-
up of its communities in the UK. These range from long-standing refugee communities, of 30 or more years, 
to more recent arrivals. This confl ict has received signifi cant but intermittent UK media coverage, with the 
common focus being violent political instability.
 In the Balkans, the confl icts involving Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia and Croatia (1992–95) and 
Kosovo and Serbia (1998–99) were part of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Although they are not strictly 
‘active confl icts’, there are still ongoing divisions and tensions. In contrast to the other two cases, these took 
place in Europe. Incoming refugees of various ethnicities formed signifi cant communities where there had 
barely been any before. 
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The overarching approach of this research was qualitative. Doing qualitative research with a small group 
of research subjects allows researchers and methodologies to be open and involved with the subject(s) 
of study. Methods can be determined by the object of study and not the other way around (Flick, et al., 
2004). For each of the three confl icts a ‘mapping exercise’ was conducted. This produced a review of 
available literature on the links between these confl icts and communities in the UK. We then identifi ed 
six case studies designed to fi ll gaps in research. The mapping exercise involved desk-based research. 
Reports, articles, websites and media reports about each case study provided information and helped 
us to approach interviews well informed. 
 Each of the case studies relied on key informant interviews. These were often with ‘gatekeepers’ 
to communities or networks of people. Key informants included local community workers, teachers, social 
workers, local authority representatives, police offi cers, voluntary organisation administrators, refugee 
community organisation directors, a director of an arts association, individuals working in the business 
sector, representatives of the Crown Prosecution Service and individuals from relevant embassies. In some 
cases, key informants were people known to the researchers from previous research. The majority of 
empirical data collected for the research came from interviews. In each case study 15–20 interviews were 
conducted, giving a total of just over 100 interviews. Interviews were semi-structured to allow discussion 
but also to keep a focus on the research questions. Interviews were conducted in English or in the 
interviewee’s fi rst language, where this was possible. All informants have been kept anonymous unless 
they have stated that they wish to be named in the research. 
 Most interviews were conducted by researchers in person, alone with informants. However, where 
this was diffi cult or impossible, interviews were conducted over the telephone or in groups. In the case 
study on the armed forces and social networking websites, many of the interviews were carried out through 
messages via the Internet. These were considered carefully for authenticity. Ethnographic methods such as 
participant observation of community events (meetings, community outreach activities, festivals) were used 
in several of the case studies. These helped us to gain insights into the locations, relations and personalities 
involved in different communities. ‘Virtual ethnography’ was also used for research on online social 
networks and communities (Hine, 2008; Boyd, 2008). These types of methods helped to gain rapid insights 
into the effects of confl icts on everyday lives. They also helped us to counter some of the challenges that we 
faced, which are described below. 
Choice of sub-projects
The mapping exercises identifi ed connections between the UK and the three selected confl ict regions with 
the aim of focusing research on particular sub-projects. These were extremely wide-ranging, covering 
foreign-aid programmes, military intervention and commercial links, as well as transnational connections 
developed by migrants from the regions and their families now resident in the UK. We also sought to identify 
a variety of different types of community. 
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 Research was organised in six case study sub-projects (Table 2). Each of the three confl ict regions 
received an equal share of project time and resources. Given the more obvious, wide-ranging impacts of 
the confl ict in Afghanistan/Pakistan on the UK it was decided to broaden the investigation to include three 
separate sub-projects covering:
• two neighbourhoods in Birmingham with signifi cant populations of Pakistani origin;
•  a ‘community of practice’ linking social services, schools and refugee community organisations that 
respond to the arrival of Afghan unaccompanied refugee and asylum-seeking children in two London 
boroughs; and
•  a ‘community of choice’ based around the organisation Help for Heroes and its online community 
HeroNet. 
The Great Lakes confl ict was followed through two case studies: 
•  one focused on responses to black young people, particularly of Congolese origin, in two London 
boroughs; and 
•  a ‘community of choice’, linking opposing sides in a campaign to change UK legal practice to allow the 
extradition of genocide suspects to Rwanda. 
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Confl ict Case study Location
Principal 
community focus
Afghanistan/Pakistan
Armed forces 
communities: Help 
for Heroes
UK-wide Community of 
choice (campaign)
Pakistani youth groups 
in two Birmingham 
neighbourhoods
Birmingham Local community
Responses to Afghan 
refugee and asylum-
seeking children in two 
London boroughs
London Community of practice
Great Lakes
Congolese and social 
marginalisation in two 
London boroughs
London Ethno-national 
community/local 
community
The attempted 
extradition of Rwandese 
genocide suspects 
by UK authorities
UK-wide Community of 
choice (campaign)
Western Balkans
Workplace socialisation 
of Balkan communities
London Local community
Table 2: The six case studies selected in relation to the three confl ict areas
Finally, the Balkans case study was a particular example of a ‘community of proximity’ and focused on a 
variety of workplaces in which individuals of Bosniac, Serbian or Kosovar Albanian origin came together in a 
diverse employment situation.
Challenges and caveats
These six case studies make no claim to be representative of the impact of the three confl icts on UK 
communities. They offer a broad cross-section, with the aim of identifying likely relationships between 
each confl ict and communities in the UK. The most signifi cant challenges of our research proved to be the 
sensitivity of much of the subject matter and the limited research time available. In some cases, one way 
in which we overcame these problems was to work through trusted, long-term contacts who knew and 
trusted the researchers. Using these contacts as key informants and gatekeepers we were able, in some 
cases, to gain access to informants. We also attempted to maximise contact and openness with research 
participants, through ethnographic methods and ‘reciprocal exposure’ (Bolognani, 2007). Other ways in 
which we overcame these issues were through sensitivity, guaranteed anonymity, respect and acceptance 
of the limits set by research participants, whilst maintaining an ethical approach.
 We sampled interviewees to represent a range of positions and viewpoints. For example, the 
case study on Rwanda interviewees included genocide survivors, survivors of other violence, Hutu and 
Tutsi, pro- and anti-government, men and women, in addition to those interviewed beyond the immediate 
Rwandese ethno-national community. We tried to verify or triangulate data from interviews with written 
materials or other research participants. However, research in such hotly contested areas is likely to reveal 
contradictory data. The ‘truth’ was not always obvious, but contradictory accounts were often revealing. 
We set out these results in the following three chapters.
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Introduction
This chapter, along with the following two, discusses the research results. The three chapters follow the 
three initial questions raised in the Introduction: ways in which overseas confl ict infl uences community 
formation, the activities in which communities engage, and the relationship between communities and 
institutions of various kinds in the UK. Globalisation results in more immediate and direct infl uence of 
overseas confl ict on the social, cultural and political life of UK-based communities. We consider four forms 
of community, outlined in the Introduction (also refer back to Table 2): 
•  place-based communities based around locations of residence or work that we will refer to as ‘local 
communities’; 
•  ethno-nationally defi ned communities;
•  communities of choice, which in this study refers to the online community of ‘Help for Heroes’ and the 
campaign around the extradition of Rwandese genocide suspects; and 
• ‘communities of practice’, which refers to professional engagement around a particular concern. 
Most individuals belong to all of these types of community. In some cases they overlap quite closely, 
as in cases where particular neighbourhoods are strongly associated with particular ethno-national 
communities. In other cases they may be quite separate but in most there will be a complex, intersecting 
pattern of memberships. One of the most signifi cant overall fi ndings of this research was that the impact of 
confl ict on these different types of community co-varied with certain key characteristics. We identifi ed six 
important areas of infl uence.
•  The nature of UK involvement in the confl ict – where this is direct and signifi cant, as in the case 
of military involvement in Afghanistan/Pakistan, few areas of the UK will not be touched in some way, 
though the impacts on different communities varies. Different types of linkage, such as diplomatic 
support for the independence of Kosovo, or humanitarian relief in the ongoing disturbances in the 
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, will produce more limited impacts. These will only be felt 
amongst those directly associated with the confl ict, typically specialist aid or human rights organisations 
and individuals from or with family links to those areas.
•  The proximity of the confl ict to the UK – this refl ects how much it is felt the confl ict has something 
to do with the UK. The confl ict in the Balkans has a greater impact than that in the Great Lakes as it is 
geographically closer. Though physical proximity is only one issue, cultural proximity is also relevant 
and means that post-colonial links increase the signifi cance of confl ict in certain areas.    
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•  The timing and duration of the confl ict – even confl icts in which UK involvement was signifi cant, 
such as the NATO bombing of Serbia and Kosovo in 1999 or the UK intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 
recede fairly rapidly in signifi cance. Duration may also be important; it is one factor raising the profi le of 
confl ict in Palestine though, in other cases, confl icts may continue for decades and still have little impact 
beyond the ethno-national community concerned, such as the dispute between North and South 
Sudan or between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
•  The size and date of arrival of the diaspora community in the UK – confl ict clearly has an impact 
on UK communities. Yet this research found that, without the mediation of ethno-nationally defi ned 
communities from one of the confl ict areas, the presence of such communities was the most consistent 
factor infl uencing the nature of such impacts. Where there are large numbers of primary migrants or their 
descendants, as in the case of the estimated 1 million UK residents with family links to Pakistan, the impact 
of confl ict in those areas will inevitably be felt more strongly. Confl ict may also result in the development 
of new ethno-national communities, through refugee movements. In this research Bosniacs, Burundians, 
Congolese, Kosovar Albanians and Rwandese are amongst groups with a small but signifi cant presence 
in the UK in 2010, though there was virtually no resident ethno-national community in 1990. Simply by their 
arrival they have contributed to the growing ‘super-diversity’ of the UK. 
•  Transnational engagement of ethno-national communities to the confl ict region – where 
particular ethno-national groups are actively involved politically, socially or culturally in developing links 
with a region of confl ict there is greater potential for those impacts to be felt beyond the immediate 
ethno-national community. In this research, the substantial resident Serbian community in the UK 
was particularly active at key times in the confl ict, such as in opposition to the NATO bombing 
campaign in 1999. The much smaller Congolese community is also extremely active in promoting 
arts events and informing public opinion. 
•  Media coverage – media coverage both refl ects and informs public opinion. The ways in which 
overseas confl icts have been simplifi ed for public consumption has refl ected public perceptions 
and responses to confl ict more generally. Inevitably, this has informed the attitudes of service 
providers. Although we made no direct attempt to evaluate media coverage, interviewees frequently 
referred to it. 
The different types of communities identifi ed for the study experience the effects of confl ict in different 
ways, as discussed below.
Local communities
Local communities are those defi ned by localities of residence or work. Overseas confl ict can force 
changes in or reassessments of such established communities. In the borough of Hounslow, the focus 
of workplace research, a social worker described the wide range of local services that were affected 
by evolutions in local communities and the challenges of meeting this new demand. An impressively 
resourceful response to the local demographic implications of the changing dynamics of confl ict was also 
given:
We had a dedicated line of policy for those coming from Bosnia or who were coming from [Kosovo]. 
So there was an issue in the fi rst instance, in the fi rst or second wave of migrants arriving and newly 
emerging communities. There was that sort of overview that we need to step up to help this particular 
community because they are struggling from strife and confl ict. […] So from the housing perspective, 
I understand, yes, there was a dedicated team that dealt with those coming from the confl ict. Like the 
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primary care trust and health needs, again, very much awareness because we were sending out 
notices […] which said: as you are aware this is the confl ict that is currently taking place, you will 
actually be more aware of an infl ux of FY [former Yugoslavia] residents coming to Hounslow. We would 
send out a paper that said these are the cultural differences you have to be aware of. […] So, it was like 
a state of heightened alert. And we would do that on any confl icts, whether it was Congo, Iran, Iraq, 
Afghanistan. […]But that’s always said against the backdrop of our current local residents. [….] we will 
step up a notch to help those who are coming in from the war-torn areas. […] We want to embrace 
them into becoming Hounslow community, and then help them to prosper and move on. 
 Hounslow community worker
We see here the direct association of confl ict with those individuals arriving from areas of confl ict, 
defi ned initially in ethno-national ‘community’ terms. Yet there is also a very positive progression, with 
the ultimate objective being to integrate individuals who arrived ‘struggling from strife and confl ict’, and 
these ‘newly emerging communities’ into ‘Hounslow community’. This not only enables the Council 
to concentrate resources on others but, ultimately, it also enables the newly arrived individuals to 
‘reciprocate’ by helping the next group of individuals to arrive. This presents an extremely positive 
impression of the evolution of both local and ethno-national communities under situations of confl ict. 
Confl ict results in the arrival of new (ethno-national) communities who, if provided with effective support 
on arrival, gradually become part of the local community. At fi rst sight this appears rather idealistic but in 
signifi cant measure it is what has happened with the various communities who arrived from the Balkans 
from the early 1990s onwards. 
 How would you describe the community you belong to?
My newsagents, number one. My barber… But I would say that my community primarily consists of 
a close circle of friends – who don’t necessarily live in the same area where I live – obviously my 
family members who are here, and I would also say the people I work with. Bearing in mind that we, 
including myself, spend a lot of time working in the city… [as for the ethnic community] My mother is 
a Bosnian Serb, my father is Bosnian Croat. So I would sometimes go to the Serbian church with my 
mother, so I would meet people coming from that sort of background. Yes, through my family 
background I would be associated with them. But, there are so many different facets to my 
personality that would not be the only thing that would be important… so I can say that I have 
multi-cultural and multi-ethnic views. 
Man, 47
Workplaces were a particularly important element of local community. These led to encounters, on a more 
neutral basis, between individuals associated with different sides of overseas confl icts. Many who arrived 
in Hounslow just before or during the Balkan confl icts in the 1990s had juggled more than one job, whilst 
trying to re-train to fi t the UK labour market or fi nd better work opportunities. Besides being a place of 
refuge from the confl ict, London provided ample opportunities for mostly casual work, and for study and 
career progression. The workplaces (e.g. restaurants, barber shops, construction sites, offi ces) where 
people were interviewed for this research were spaces of interaction amongst ethnicities and cultures; 
dialogue was inevitable and stereotypes were challenged. 
I am a barber… There are six of us who work in our shop, mainly Greek Cypriots and North Africans… 
My clients are from all communities you can imagine living in London, including regular Serbian 
clients… There, I have an obligation to accept and respect everyone… Confl ict affects relations at 
work, of course… You are at work physically, but mentally you are over there [Kosovo]… I remember 
hearing on the radio when some of my friends were killed and I would go in the bathroom and cry… 
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But work was a place where I could also inform people about Kosovo and Albanians there, and 
challenge stereotypes… The Balkans is a very complex place. 
Kosovar Albanian man, 50s
Such spaces of interaction have become a common, even mundane, fact of life in local UK communities, 
particularly in London. Yet they were being rapidly lost in the FY, where confl ict had turned ethnically mixed 
areas in ‘ethnically clean’ regions, especially in BiH, whose ethnic map before the war resembled a leopard 
skin (the metaphor has been attributed to Serbian politician Vuk Draskovic; for more on these ‘ethnically 
cleansed’ spaces, see Tuathail and O’Loughlin, 2009). 
 In the Birmingham neighbourhoods that formed the focus of the third case study, UK-born 
children and grandchildren of Pakistani migrants see themselves as members of a broader Muslim 
community. They were concerned about a range of issues, such as local religious observance and the 
situation in Palestine, as well as the severity of the crisis in Pakistan (which many of them had only visited 
rarely, if at all). The confl ict in Pakistan has highlighted, and perhaps contributed to, this development 
of religious identifi cation. The understanding of local communities is also signifi cantly overlain with 
ethno-national communities, though rather than fading with time, the recent confl ict in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan has exacerbated these differences. For example, the young people interviewed for this 
research frequently referred to their own neighbourhoods as ‘Asian’ neighbourhoods – safe spaces where 
they felt respected. This contrasted with the increasing levels of racism they reported experiencing outside 
of their home areas. Young people from these areas are re-interpreting the localities in which they live, 
in the light of a variety of additional forms of belonging to broader national and global communities. 
However, the ways in which they do so remain profoundly infl uenced by these localities and the 
relationships they form there. 
 The informants were also affected by the labelling of Pakistani Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ 
(Hickman, et al., 2010), due to the pervasive parliamentary and media discourse. Links were made between 
political opposition to the war in Afghanistan, the disaffection and radicalisation of Pakistani Muslims, 
security threats and training camps in Pakistan, and home-grown terrorism. So the Afghanistan/Pakistan 
confl ict became associated with a broader anti-terrorist security discourse that is widely seen as being 
anti-Muslim. The informants unanimously felt that the war in Afghanistan and the related war on terror had 
given Pakistani Muslims a negative profi le, not only in Britain but also worldwide. 
In school that was another issue. People were talking about Islam a lot more, you could hear people 
talking about Islam and discussing Islam but probably not from the right perspective. And the word 
jihad was everywhere and it was just Islam equals jihad. People formed opinions very quickly based 
on what they saw on the news. 
Woman, 21
Even before 9/11, studies were showing that British Pakistanis were turning towards Islamic self-
understandings (Jacobson, 1998; Al-Ali, et al., 2001). Informants in this research noted the heightened 
security context as a further stimulus towards the development of religious communal identities, which 
some felt developed further divisions:
The more religious everyone becomes the more she [mother] looks at me and says ‘oh no you’re not 
religious at all now’ and it’s like a vicious circle. And I don’t understand how it’s been brought about, 
like even cousins here they’ve become a lot more religious it’s just sprung out of the blue over the last 
couple of years it might have had something to do with the terrorist attacks and the harsh racism of 
the media. 
Woman, 23
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The deepest investment in Muslim identity was among young working-class Pakistani men – who have 
also born the brunt of the demonisation of Pakistani Muslims and the material consequences. Islam was 
a boundary defi ning ‘us and them’ that they policed authoritatively – controlling their sisters’ behaviour, 
asserting their power to defi ne ‘their’ women and control the boundaries of ethnic identity, part of a wider 
reconfi guring of the racialised masculine hierarchy by projecting a hyper-masculinity (see Archer, 2001). 
Communities of choice
In addition to provoking an evolution in established local communities, overseas confl ict may also 
result in the formation of entirely new communities, which set out to contest understandings of the 
confl ict from a particular perspective. The recently developed organisation Help for Heroes is one such 
example. It was formed to highlight the situation of families of service personnel and to publicly contest 
negative perceptions of the armed forces formed by association with an unpopular war. The armed 
forces are divided by the same differences that divide British society – class, gender, age and race – but 
also by rivalries between the different services and strict hierarchies. They are united by the common 
experiences of a military life and, at times of war, of confl ict. Interviewees spoke about the armed forces 
as a family, a community and a way of life, and even many years after leaving the armed forces retained a 
sense of a military identity. 
I have always been fond of a saying ‘I’m not a civilian, I’m ex-military’ and therefore I will always be more 
a part of the armed forces community. 
Man, 36
Casualties, injuries and mental health problems among members of the armed forces who have served in 
Afghanistan have destroyed families. Bryn Parry, the founder of Help for Heroes, gives some indication of 
his motivations for starting the organisation: 
The burden of this war falls on a small and shrinking community of service personnel and their families. 
While the rest of the population carries on with their normal lives, our men and women fi ght and their 
loved ones wait.
This understanding of confl ict as impacting primarily on those directly involved in the confl ict itself 
also extended to refugees. Part of the work of Help for Heroes involves a ‘publicity war’ to change the 
perception of the armed forces and the wounded. The very name ‘Help for Heroes’ signals a change 
in tone from long-standing service charities such as the British Legion, Combat Stress, and Soldiers, 
Sailors, Airmen and Families Association. This is a more technically and publicity-savvy organisation that 
has tapped into a sense of abandonment, anger and patriotism felt by many within the ‘armed 
forces community’. It has created a heightened sense of togetherness among this community and drawn 
in sympathisers.
 Representing a group of people determined not to be cut off and ignored, Help for Heroes has 
waged an effective publicity campaign about wounded soldiers and raised a huge amount of money –  
between October 2007, when they were founded, and December 2009, when they had their last annual 
review, the organisation raised over £40 million, more than £47,000 a day. This sum has certainly increased 
due to continued high-profi le activities in 2010. While the organisation’s public activities have been high-
profi le, the private spaces on their online social network, HeroNet (among other websites) have a different 
role to play in this publicity campaign. The distinction between public and private spaces is central to the 
study of online social networks (Boyd, 2008). HeroNet has created a new community of sympathisers and 
sufferers, and represents a private ‘backstage’ where the public face and activities of Help for Heroes can 
be discussed and rehearsed. HeroNet is a source of companionship and support for those who are lonely 
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and upset, and information for those who are confused and worried. Families, friends and supporters are 
drawn into these online communities.
I visit this site occasionally, again it just makes me feel a little closer to what is going on… I do think of it 
as a community and it is important to me… it does help me actually being part of this network. 
Woman, 53
Communities of choice, in this sense, function to provide individuals who feel affected by a particular 
confl ict, yet are physically isolated, with a greater sense of community solidarity. 
 Our Rwanda case study illustrates a similar set of relationships, where a community has formed 
around a particular campaign linked to the confl ict. In this case, the principal mobilisation was by the 
Rwandese, around the attempted extradition of four Rwandese accused of genocide. This community is 
not exclusively defi ned around a common cause or agreement on a certain issue, but on an understanding 
of its principal elements, such as a grasp of the relevant information necessary to follow events associated 
with a confl ict that few people in the UK follow in any real detail. In this sense it also serves as an antidote to 
isolation, which is felt by many Rwandese, physically separated around the UK. 
As a community, we felt targeted by those cases. We came together to try to decide what to do 
and set up a small group Action for Peace and Justice for Rwanda to try to mobilise the whole 
community… we felt that this was an issue that affected any educated Rwandese, anyone who 
had responsibilities back home, whether or not he or she was involved in the genocide. We agreed 
to have a common strategy and wrote to UK authorities, organised protests and attended the 
trials… I am not against justice. It is fi ne for anyone to be arrested and tried, but not fi ne for them to 
be brought to justice in Rwanda. We want trials in the UK or a third country. 
Man, early 50s
This quote highlights the ethno-national focus of this campaign, though there was a limited involvement of 
non-Rwandese. Most non-Rwandese got involved in a professional capacity because they represented 
a human rights organisation. A number of organisations such as African Rights, Redress (which works 
against torture), Aegis Trust and Human Rights Watch monitored the extradition process and lobbied on 
a number of issues including a campaign for a change in UK law so the suspects could be tried in the UK 
and against the extradition on human rights grounds since they felt that the men would not get a fair trial 
in Rwanda. Beyond the involvement of professionals, a limited number of non-Rwandese family members 
and friends were involved in the campaign and attended the trial. The majority of the small numbers of non-
Rwandese who attend the hearings at Westminster Magistrates Court were from church congregations 
that some of the men attended: 
In court, those Rwandese who were there, were mostly the family of the accused and people 
from their church congregations who were there for moral support. For example, many members 
of the [town] Pentecostal Church and Catholic Church came along including quite a few 
elderly ladies. 
Crown Prosecution Service representative 
This introduces the signifi cant role played by religious organisations in responding to confl ict. Although 
this was not a specifi c focus of this research, interviewees frequently highlighted the role of churches and 
mosques in local communities, though these must ultimately be seen as communities of choice. In some 
cases, such as the national campaign A Prayer for Congo in churches of all denominations, religious 
institutions actively engaged with the identifi cation of confl ict-related concerns. 
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Communities of practice
A third example of community formation is a community of practice. Within the case study of the Afghanistan/
Pakistan confl ict one of the topics we explored was the situation of Afghan unaccompanied asylum-seeking 
children (UASC) in two neighbouring boroughs of London. The community in question is made up of individuals 
and organisations that support Afghan UASC: teachers; social workers; refugee support organisations; and 
Afghan refugee community organisations (RCOs). This community could also include others such as youth 
workers, Islamic clergy, healthcare providers, but these were not accessed during the project period.
 This particular community of practice has emerged in response to a wish and/or need to assist 
and understand the challenges faced by Afghan UASC and those who support them. In this case, 
individuals associated with UK institutions (social workers, teachers, refugee support workers) were 
concerned about how to support Afghan UASC in their professional work and were aware that they had a 
lack of knowledge about this small but rapidly growing group, particularly in comparison with other larger, 
or more established, ethnic minority and migrant groups. Meanwhile, Afghan RCOs were concerned about 
the future faced by UASC and how they could help them to settle in to the UK, whilst not ‘forgetting their 
culture’ or ‘being led astray by [other non-Afghan migrants]’ (informant interview). Both Afghan and 
non-Afghan organisations shared a concern for the needs and future of Afghan UASC but that was not 
necessarily the catalyst for their interaction. For example, an Afghan RCO approached a local school when 
it needed space for weekend supplementary classes (in Afghan languages, English, science and maths). 
Thus, a connection between the school and the RCO was established, which then meant the school turned 
to the RCO for help in understanding the backgrounds of their growing numbers of Afghan UASC. This kind 
of back-and-forth communication, and reciprocity, is an important element in the formation of communities 
of practice.
Ethno-national communities
Ethno-national communities intersect with most of the other elements of community in our case studies. 
Local communities change with the arrival of individuals moving directly from confl ict zones, to which 
they have to respond or evolve in response to confl ict affecting ethno-national communities which are 
concentrated in particular areas. Yet ethno-national communities also evolve themselves as a result of 
confl ict. An interesting, and perhaps unexpected outcome, of the Rwandese extradition cases that was 
mentioned by two interviewees has been a rapprochement between some members of the Congolese and 
Rwandese diasporas:
I used to have terrible problems with some people in the Congolese diaspora. Once I attended one 
of the meetings on the Great Lakes in the Parliament and when some of the Congolese there learned 
I was Rwandese, they started being abusive. I had to be escorted by security guards to the 
underground station… But suddenly because of the trials, they [Congolese] realised that not all 
Rwandese like the current Rwandese government, which they blame for creating problems in Congo, 
and that some of us also have problems because of the Government. 
Woman, late 20s
These kind of inter-communal exchanges were a more widespread characteristic of confl ict. The 
presence of Afghan asylum seekers in neighbourhoods of Birmingham associated with Pakistani Muslim 
communities was also a direct way in which the confl ict impacted on those areas. The Afghans were mostly 
young men: some ‘freshies’ working in ‘£2 an hour jobs’ in Asian businesses in their neighbourhood, 
others studying with them at school and college. One male informant described the Afghans as ‘hard as 
nails’ because they’d gone through a lot to get to the UK and, as a consequence, had formed their own 
group called the AMK [Afghan Muslim Krew]. Many Afghans in the area had spent more of their lives in 
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refugee camps in Pakistan than in Afghanistan itself and were attracted to these neighbourhoods through 
a combination of the economics of cheaper housing and cultural affi nities. 
 Those who have experienced confl ict fi rst hand obviously feel its greatest impact. This category is 
restricted to soldiers who have experienced active service and refugees. In 2010 this includes a relatively 
small number of people in the UK. Second, however, are those who have experienced confl ict indirectly, 
through a close contact with individuals who have had fi rst-hand experience. An important consequence 
of globalisation is that more and more people in the UK fall into the second category, most obviously 
comprised of the families of those who have experienced direct impacts. For refugees these relationships 
automatically describe ethno-national communities and, given the dominant white working-class origins of 
many in the armed forces, this is also largely true for soldiers’ families. 
 Religious institutions play an important role in providing support and generating awareness. 
Although religious communities were not included in the initial research design they were involved in some 
way in all six of the communities studied. This may reinforce particular ethno-national links, such as the 
strong associations of the Orthodox Church with the Serbian community. Alternatively, it may also foster 
powerful community ties that cut across ethno-nationally defi ned groups, such as the prominent presence 
of church members at the trial of one of the Rwandese facing extradition. Communities of practice 
provide a further institutionalised response to heightening local service provision. Although most of these 
impacts are felt through ethno-nationally defi ned communities, confl ict may also result in an evolution 
in rigid understandings of community from this basis, as experienced by migrants from the Balkans in 
their workplace encounters, through political engagement in the Great Lakes and through casual, local 
community-based exchanges in Birmingham. Having considered the ways in which confl ict contributes to 
changes in the way communities evolve or form, we now turn to the activities in which these communities 
engage, often challenging the impact of confl ict. 
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The communities that have emerged from our case studies position themselves in various ways in relation 
to the three confl icts that formed our initial area of enquiry. Their signifi cance, and the role of confl ict in their 
formation and development, only really becomes clear when we examine how  they have attempted to 
engage or challenge the engagement of others in response to the confl icts that continue to defi ne them. 
Information is central to this engagement. Interviewees, whether they were soldiers or social workers, were 
aware of how public opinion perceived them more broadly. This, typically, resulted in a rejection of the 
over-simplifi cation of mainstream media representations of complex confl icts. In some cases support was 
found in alternative media sources but in some cases even these were considered confusing, inaccurate 
or inward-looking and particularly the campaigning communities of choice developed direct public 
awareness-raising campaigns. Others, particularly communities of practice, focused on direct engagement 
for policy change. This range of engagements is considered below. 
Dissatisfaction with mainstream media representations of confl ict
Overseas confl ict is inevitably complex and many individuals felt that broader British public opinion 
misrepresented or was completely ignorant of ongoing confl icts around which the engagements of the 
various communities studied here had developed. One of the most common engagements in response 
to confl ict was therefore the attempt to question or publicly challenge understandings of the confl ict. This 
was most common amongst groups with limited history of settlement in the UK. Migrants from FY and 
the Balkans more widely are part of the ‘new migration’ (Markova and Black, 2007) in the UK. With the 
exception of the Serbian community, which had a strong post-WWII diaspora settled in the UK, other 
communities had almost no history of settlement in Britain until the regional confl icts of the 1990s. Some 
Bosnian interviewees, in particular, were very upset with the way Bosnia was introduced to the British 
public, as a ‘primitive’ people.
The way that the war in Bosnia was portrayed by the media was very humiliating. I really, really 
felt humiliated. What most of media picked up was pictures of desperate people leaving villages 
with bundles, old women, toothless men, sitting on the ground, eating. So it just disfi gured 
Bosnia as a country and I was annoyed. You could barely see something, I don’t know what 
would the word be, civilised, something that would show that Bosnia is a normal country where 
life goes as anywhere else. ... So for an average Briton watching BBC news and reports and 
seeing that, they probably felt sorry for poor women who came out of nowhere, and she must be 
over the moon for being here. A lot of anger. A lot of anger. Just trying to explain… I know what the 
phone is, I know what the TV is, you don’t need to show me how to use it. I had computer in my 
house as well, you know, I use that. … I mean the media that we had back home played a 
signifi cant role in spreading hatred and fear, and animosity, and… fi ring up emotions… There is 
more democracy here than there, but unfortunately… even here the way that media portrays the 
refugees is beyond belief.  
Woman, 47
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4  UK community responses to 
overseas confl ict
Despite this criticism, Bosniac and Kosovar Albanian interviewees felt that the media had played an 
important role in raising awareness about the confl ict. For instance, another Bosniac woman recounted 
how her father had been in a concentration camp for almost a year – with hundreds of other Bosniac 
men; the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations were on the ground, but the situation was 
deteriorating. Her father was later air-lifted from the camp to the UK, where his family joined him. She is of 
the opinion that:
… if it wasn’t for the journalists who broadcast the stories, the international community wouldn’t react. 
So we are very thankful for that… I think that they raised awareness… of what was happening in 
Bosnia, and certain actions were then taken. 
Woman, 37
Similarly, Kosovar Albanians were seen very favourably, an image that supported the generous welcome 
they received from British civil society and public opinion in general. The Serbs, however, generally felt that 
the British media had stereotyped them as perpetrators of war crimes in the region. For many Serbians this 
led to their public retreat from a Serbian identity, presenting themselves as Bosnian or Russian. However, 
a small group, some of whom were interviewed for this research, attempted to resist this characterisation, 
focusing on positive messages of the strong ties between the UK and Serbia. A notable achievement of 
this core group, in their goal of portraying themselves in a fairer, more differentiated way, was the opening 
of the Serbian section in Fulham library, which aims to inform the wider British public about Serbian history, 
culture and society. 
 Rwandese informants felt similarly. The UK has relatively few links with Rwanda and most UK 
residents have limited knowledge about the Great Lakes region, beyond the fact that genocide occurred in 
Rwanda and that there has been ongoing violent confl ict in the Congo. This often acted as a barrier to the 
formation of relationships between individuals from the region and other UK residents:
Most of my friends here are Rwandese. The problem is that other people always ask me where I am 
from. As soon as I say ‘Rwanda’, they say ‘oh, wasn’t that where the genocide happened? So are you 
Hutu or Tutsi?’ Straight away, they start to categorise us… So I only have a few English friends, a 
couple of schoolmates and my managers, but then I have to explain everything all the time… Had I 
known this, I would not have claimed asylum in the UK as a Rwandese. People here have such a 
simple understanding of Rwanda… I would like to stay alone and not have to explain all the time. It 
makes me focus on the past and my mind has to go back to that previous time. 
Rwandese woman, mid-30s
The common complaint was that media representations of confl ict are simplistic and usually polarised, 
refl ecting easily understandable views of confl ict based in divisions between two groups. In turn, there 
are consequences for institutional actors. Awareness of the complexity of such divisions, the blurred 
boundaries and the multiple, shifting identities requires a more fi nely detailed knowledge of any particular 
confl ict situation. Specialised knowledge is rare, but detailed policy responses should clearly be based on 
understandings of confl ict that refl ect its complexity as much as possible. 
Successes and failures of alternative media
The growth of the Internet and associated new media, particularly the social networking sites of Web 2.0, 
has been a key element of technological development since about 2004. In some cases, this has provided 
a solution to the frustrations of mainstream information sources. Members of the armed forces community 
also reported the attentiveness of mainstream media to news of wars involving British soldiers, and how 
it was presented. Several people reported that they followed the news and any information about the war 
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closely, though this was not universally the case. One informant, a former soldier, reported disappointment 
at the inaccuracy and over-simplifi cation in coverage of the war in a similar way to Rwandese or Serbians 
discussing other confl icts. 
I fi nd the coverage upsetting because it reminds me of my time in Iraq… a time I do not wish to revisit in 
my mind. Some of the coverage I have seen in the past has been accurate as far as the media goes 
– but no one can understand it until they have seen it fi rst hand. It is defi nitely a personal choice not to 
watch, listen, read or talk about Afghanistan or Iraq with anyone other than other soldiers who have 
been there. 
Man, 29
The desire, not only to be better informed about these issues but also to be able to discuss them with 
others who had direct confl ict experience, could be fulfi lled by sites such as the specialised discussion 
forums of HeroNet. This did little to address the broader issues of public information but it provided a 
community where dispersed individuals could at least discuss things amongst themselves. 
 Internet and, particularly, satellite-based communications provided an opportunity for individuals to 
receive news from beyond the UK. This was most widely used by fi rst-generation migrants who welcomed 
the possibility of watching familiar television stations in their own language. However, this enthusiasm was 
rarely shared with subsequent generations. In the case of the Birmingham neighbourhoods, although 
most people had family currently living or who had previously lived in Pakistan, the young informants were 
at pains to point out that their interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan was not due to the particularity of their 
familial or ancestral connections. Rather, their knowledge of Pakistan was patchy and they found it diffi cult 
to make sense of the news from Pakistan as it concerned politicians and places they didn’t know much 
about. They were sceptical about the truth of any media reports from there. What drew them to the war in 
Afghanistan was a sense that innocent Muslims were dying there. 
With the news from Pakistan it’s diffi cult to relate to it or make sense of it because I never actually lived 
there myself, I only once went to Pakistan and that was when I was eleven so it’s hard to know the 
places that they’re talking about. I just feel like there are constantly so many problems in Pakistan and 
you can never understand how things fi t together or what the true story is. I think the news isn’t reliable, 
a lot of news channels tell different stories there’s no certain, nobody’s identifying who’s doing these 
bombings so it’s a bit abstract. 
Woman, 20
The suspicion of the information she was receiving from the media in the UK was common to most informants 
for this research, though in this case she was equally suspicious of information from Pakistani sources. So, 
alternative media provides one solution, enabling individuals to identify specialised media and discuss it with 
like-minded individuals, but it cannot be a complete picture since it also severely limits the opportunity to 
engage with broader public opinion. Some organisations fi nd that the only way to do that is directly.
Direct challenge to public opinion
Help for Heroes was established to challenge the portrayal of soldiers engaged in an unpopular war and 
to provide support for families of those wounded or killed in action. Fundraising activities were the main 
type of action taken by members of the social networking site, HeroNet in response to the war. They also 
participated in online activities, social networking, chats and discussions. Through the activities of its 
supporters, as well as through high-profi le events such as the concert at Twickenham Rugby Stadium on 
12 September 2010, Help for Heroes has raised an enormous amount of money. In 2008, they raised and 
donated 13 million pounds to military charities. Users of HeroNet were very positive about the work of Help 
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for Heroes, arguing that it had raised the profi le of the plight of wounded members of the armed forces and 
their families. HeroNet seems to be a response to the sense that there are many small groups and families 
who are either suffering from the effects of having loved ones away serving in the military, or have dead or 
injured friends or relatives due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Challenging the negative impressions of 
soldiers fi ghting an unpopular war fosters support for their fundraising exercises.
 Major public demonstrations were a key strategy for other responses to the war, most famously 
Stop the War. The war in Afghanistan/Pakistan had a signifi cant impact and politicised many of the young 
people of Pakistani origin interviewed in Birmingham for this research, some of whom had travelled to 
London for Stop the War rallies. The campaign became part of a peer dynamic where everybody was 
doing it, so they would go along to demonstrations with siblings and friends. As it involved trips to 
other cities without parents, it could also be a form of social empowerment. For some, engagement in 
mainstream anti-war activities was moderated by the characteristics of the predominantly working-class 
Birmingham neighbourhoods in which they lived. They were inevitably brought into contact with soldiers 
going off to fi ght. Their response was no more supportive, but tinged with a level of empathy that suggested 
a degree of understanding:
I don’t see why they need to send little kids, why they need to send 18–19 year olds over to other 
countries and then teach them how to shoot? ’Cos I think that teenagers that are going over [to 
Afghanistan]. What are their parents thinking? ’Cos like I know ’cos there are a lot of white people 
around where I live, and their sons are going off to Afghanistan, and I’m thinking what if he never comes 
back? You’re sending them there to get killed, I don’t understand what they’re thinking.
Man, 18
Two signifi cant organisations have arisen around the 50th anniversary of Congolese independence. 
In June 2010, they were both followed for this research, during the independence period. The fi rst was 
a high-profi le series of events at the Southbank Centre, in London, that showcased Congolese artistic 
production and was established in conjunction with a range of large, British non-government organisations 
(NGOs). The second was a smaller commemoration called Congo 50, which was mostly organised by 
Congolese students. It provided a more grassroots commemoration that sought to directly challenge the 
image of the DRC as poor and resourceless. Along with nationwide initiatives, such as the Prayer for 
Congo (see page 22), these organisations set out to publicise the links between the UK and the DRC, 
particularly issues such as the signifi cant export of coltan from DRC, which is an essential element of 
mobile phone construction and, some argue, is a driving force behind confl ict in the DRC (Vesperini, 2001).
 This promotion of positive messages may be undermined by the legacy of overseas confl ict. 
We found it was extremely rare for violent overseas confl icts to result in violent impacts in the UK, but this 
does unarguably occur in certain contexts. One such example is the Congolese group Combattants de 
Londres, a self-styled ‘resistance group’ to the current administration of the DRC. They formed around 
a strident Congolese nationalism, and maintain a signifi cant web presence targeted at a non-UK based 
audience and organise regular, vocal demonstrations outside the embassy of the DRC in London. 
These activities are reinforced by occasional criminal activities that guarantee a high profi le, such as 
burning the cars of political opponents and setting fi re to the embassy of the DRC in 2007 (Taylor, 2007). 
The Combattants are able to exert a disproportionately signifi cant infl uence over the Congolese 
community (Allen, 2008).4 The Combattants have rejected the notion of independence, maintaining that 
Congo remains colonised, and they have therefore not only boycotted, but some say actively tried to 
sabotage independence commemorations. Just as the public response to the Afghanistan/Pakistan war is 
publicly contested by Help for Heroes and Stop the War, at a smaller scale, the public image of Congo 
is contested. 
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Community engagement in response to confl ict
The infl uence of events outside the UK in determining even relatively mundane events of community 
organisation in the UK was also a characteristic of Congolese community activities. Just as the confl ict in 
the Great Lakes region has drawn in neighbouring countries, community activities in the UK often crossed 
national boundaries and relationships between Congolese, those of Congolese descent and others from 
the Great Lakes region. This has occasionally resulted in tensions between individuals from the region in the 
UK. Partly in response to this tension, many community organisations emphasise the benefi ts of instituting 
best practice in the way they organise. Interventions that ensure a non-sectarian political space are 
important; for example, offering services to all members of a ‘French speaking African community’ without 
discriminating on ethnicity. The director of a community association emphasised this idea of inclusiveness 
as an ideological principle, but also as a demonstration of unity directed at broader ‘British’ society:
We need to welcome anyone coming in, but when we do that sometimes we are not understood by 
the wider [Congolese] community… for my staff I always tell them that the door is open to everybody, 
Rwandese, Congolese, Hutu, Tutsi because we all came over here to seek asylum for reasons of 
persecution. We need to set an example, we need to teach them that once we are in England you 
need to learn to live with each other… It is very important for the leaders to understand that we need to 
be one. If we are not one here not only the British society will not accept us, but we are not going to be 
able to rebuild our own country when we go back home.
Director of a community association
One of the ways in which other UK residents get involved in issues about confl ict regions is through their 
support for anti-deportation campaigns. In recent years, anti-deportation campaigns have assembled 
family, friends, neighbours and other local residents from the communities where failed asylum seekers 
live. These campaigns have become increasingly well-organised and networked in the UK, through bodies 
such as the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns. Anti-deportation groups have organised 
demonstrations, written to ministers, MPs and local councillors, and offered support to the individual 
asylum seekers and their families. In some cases, high-profi le UK residents have become involved, such as 
the actor Colin Firth. Alongside fi ve UK bishops, Firth campaigned against the deportation of Congolese 
asylum seekers in early 2007 – in particular, for nurse ‘Pierre’, who later obtained a last-minute reprieve and 
was able to stay in the UK (Refugee Council, 2007). 
 In the case of DRC, in August 2007, the Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, was ordered by a high court 
judge to suspend deportations of unsuccessful asylum seekers to the DRC, after evidence of rape and 
torture of deportees by Congolese offi cials emerged. However, in March 2010 the UK Home Offi ce tried 
to resume deportations. This has led to a range of protests and anti-deportation campaigns. For example, 
at the time of writing, several residents in Cardiff, Wales, mobilised in a campaign to stop the deportation 
of Wanda Tete, who fl ed to the UK from the DRC in January 2005 and claimed asylum. Wanda Tete was a 
member of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress opposition party in DRC and claimed she was a 
target of the Kabila government because of her political activities. Her asylum claim was rejected and on 21 
September 2010 after more than fi ve years in the UK, she was arrested and taken to Yarls Wood Removal 
Centre. Local residents – both Congolese and non-Congolese – mobilised in a demonstration outside the 
UK Border Agency offi ce in Cardiff on 24 September 2010.
 In the two London boroughs studied, the interventions by UK residents supporting Afghan UASC 
were also linked to questions of publicity and information. However, in this case, there were concerns about 
a specialist, professional application of information to be shared amongst the established community 
of practice. Afghan RCOs provided information about the Afghan cultural context; and social workers, 
teachers and others provided information about opportunities available to Afghan UASC in the UK. For 
example, an Afghan RCO ran a workshop for teachers, social workers and other interested individuals.
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It educated local service providers and offered alternatives to other information sources. The RCO felt that 
mainstream media sources were too focused on extreme interpretations of Islam and the current confl ict 
situation in Afghanistan, rather than providing information about Afghan history and culture. Workshop 
participants were invited because they were locally based, and the event was not explicitly about UASC. 
However, most participants said they were there mainly because they wanted to learn more about the 
background of the growing numbers of Afghan UASC with whom they were working. 
 Some teachers said they were attending because they were worried about some of the behaviour 
they had seen, for example in the classroom. They were hoping that more information on their students’ 
background would help them to manage their behaviour more effectively. According to the RCO, a key 
impact of the workshop was the networking aspect, and the opportunity to make personal connections 
between different people and institutions supporting Afghan UASC. One outcome of this workshop (and 
other similar events) was that the RCO was able to put schools in touch with a group of university students 
of Afghan descent. These students offer mentoring services to Afghan pupils and give talks, encouraging 
them to consider the opportunities that university might offer. Some of the mentors arrived in the UK as 
UASC themselves. Another example of an intervention – this time initiated by a borough council children 
and family services team, in co-operation with an Afghan RCO – are information evenings about fostering 
Afghan UASC. Both social workers and RCOs are keen for more Afghan families to consider fostering 
Afghan UASC and to do so formally, with the support of the borough. This is apparently a diffi cult area due 
to some mistrust of local authorities by Afghan families. Only a very small number of Afghan foster parents 
remain in the two boroughs.    
 This chapter has focused on how the communities under consideration actively responded 
to overseas confl ict. The most common activity involved various ways of contesting the nature of the 
information in circulation about the confl ict of concern to them. For some ethno-national communities this 
initially took the form of an individual dissatisfaction with how they were portrayed in mainstream media, 
which was only really countered on an individual basis. In some cases however, such as the development 
of the Serbian collection at Fulham library, this took on a more collective approach. In other cases, such 
as Help for Heroes, the community arose from and developed its own links through online discussion 
forums, which allowed a rejection of mainstream media. In others, alternative media sources, or the ability 
to access foreign media through satellite, provided an alternative to UK news sources. Yet it was one which 
many of the second- and third-generation Pakistanis said they found unhelpful and did not trust any more 
so than the UK media. A third strategy, open to large and better resourced community groups (e.g. Help 
for Heroes), is a direct challenge to public perceptions through high-profi le concerts, with internationally 
famous artists. To a lesser extent, both Congo Now and Congo 50 attempted a similar approach. Finally, 
the community of practice was motivated by a concern about the usefulness of available information 
on Afghan UASC. We now turn to the forms of engagement with UK institutions taken by these various 
communities, and their relationship with the initial confl ict.
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If service providers are to assess the impact of overseas confl ict effectively they require a detailed 
knowledge, not only of conditions in the UK, but also of the complexities of any confl ict situation with 
which they are faced. An understanding of the internal complexities of the many different overseas confl icts 
may be important when providing services to populations of diverse origins. Yet it is obviously unrealistic 
to expect service providers, particularly at a local level, to have a thorough knowledge of such issues. 
There are, however, some key examples of good practice to highlight, which allowed service providers to 
overcome this challenge. 
 In some cases this type of specialised knowledge, or at least the framework for evaluating the 
ever-changing contexts of overseas confl ict, already form part of the response of the service providers 
interviewed for this research. For example, this was the case for the community cohesion worker in 
Hounslow: in Hounslow council, confl ict-related briefi ngs are prepared regularly and circulated widely 
to inform social workers, housing offi cers, teachers and NHS staff of the details of particular confl icts 
that might affect their work. This appears to mostly involve the preparation of services for the arrival of 
certain refugee groups. It could usefully be extended to provide information on how individuals of different 
backgrounds, already resident in the UK, may respond to particular overseas confl ict, so that staff are 
prepared and attuned to the potential complexities. Despite the impressive array of services already offered 
to support individuals in Hounslow, there was still a lot to be done in terms of developing tailored services, 
according to one community support worker in Hounslow.
I don’t honestly think, in the same way that people who come from Pakistan or Afghanistan, and the 
wars they have been through and the traumas they have been through. And this is a personal view. 
I don’t think as a service provider per se, as a council, that while we have an understanding of it, just 
how much we embed that in the services that we deliver, I don’t think we do. 
Hounslow community support worker
The community of practice around Afghan UASC has experimented with different ways of understanding 
and responding to psychological trauma caused by confl ict. Where personal connections (or networks) 
exist, relations between the different individuals and institutions supporting Afghan UASC have led to 
positive activities and the sharing of information. This is one of the few examples of service providers 
drawing on the expertise of the migrants or refugees who have come from particular regions of confl ict, 
in the form of the Afghan RCO. However, there are some issues, or challenges, that should be taken into 
account. Previous research has questioned the role of RCOs, and whether they are representative of the 
‘community’ they claim to serve (e.g. see Griffi ths, et al., 2005). It is positive that local service providers 
are supporting, and being supported by, Afghan RCOs to learn more about the specifi c needs of Afghan 
RCOs. However, the same service providers are not always attentive to the fact that Afghanistan is a 
mosaic of different ethnic, linguistic, political and social groups. For example, a Hazara child from central 
Afghanistan might have a very different background from a Pashtun child from eastern Afghanistan.
 There is an additional risk to be considered, regarding communities of practice. Although 
research participants suggested that these are successful because of the personal connections 
involved, Afghan UASC living in areas where such communities do not exist risk ‘falling through the 
gaps’, increasing their vulnerability further (see also Mougne, 2010). There is an interesting juxtaposition 
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between the borough employees and teachers, and the clients of Afghan NGOs that speaks directly to 
the issue of how communities are formed and understood. Whilst social services and schools operate 
with a place-based perspective (a catchment area or a borough), Afghan RCOs’ clients may operate 
with a different perspective, based more on solidarity networks; there are multiple Afghan RCOs in 
London with different reputations for being co-ordinated by particular ethnic or political personalities. 
There are many Afghan RCOs in London and, though none of them present themselves as representing 
any particular Afghan ethnic group, Afghans will usually interpret their affi liations as being directed by 
the ethnic group of their coordination team. This means they develop reputations for being sectarian, 
even if this is not their explicit intention. Previous work suggests Afghan clients may cross London to 
visit an RCO with which they feel an affi nity, rather than pick a local one (Oeppen, 2008). The approach 
of the community of practice, focused on an individual borough. Working in conjunction with that 
borough’s RCO tends to assume that ethno-national communities are divisible in the same way as local 
communities. Our research indicated that, through the relevant RCOs, a community of practice is more 
likely to be engaging with all Afghans of a specifi c ethnic group, across a much wider area, than with all 
Afghans within its borough. 
 In Birmingham, young people reported that awareness of the confl ict in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
amongst service providers had affected their interactions with statutory services,  particularly via education, 
youth services, and policing. Offi cials in these three areas were certainly aware of the potential impact 
of the Afghanistan/Pakistan confl ict. In some cases, young people of Pakistani origin reported that they 
were treated more sensitively, for example, by schoolteachers who made it clear that they should not be 
stereotyped in any way and asked them to report any racist behaviour or abuse they faced. However, 
several young people reported that they believed an awareness of the impact of the confl ict had resulted in 
racist stereotyping by other offi cials, in particular, police offi cers, who detained them for reasons that did not 
seem to relate to normal crime prevention.
 Several of our case studies focused on national level campaigns and, therefore, directly engaged 
with national institutions. The role of the military is the most obvious example of this. For members of the 
armed forces communities, the Afghanistan/Pakistan confl ict has resulted in a serious re-examination of 
relationships with UK government institutions. Serving members of the armed forces, and some ex-armed 
forces, had a positive outlook on relations with British government institutions, the nation and the royal 
family. However, the war in Afghanistan has led to a breakdown in trust between members of the armed 
forces, their friends and families, and the Ministry of Defence and UK government. Help for Heroes is always 
very careful not to be seen defending the cause of the war itself, but focuses on its impact on those who 
have fought. Individuals interviewed on HeroNet, including those who had fought in the war or whose family 
was involved in the armed forces, commonly shared the perspective of broader UK public opinion against 
the war (BBC, 2009). Yet this only boosted their concern that the soldiers, who had sacrifi ced so much for 
what they felt was a good cause, should not be seen as scapegoats. They did not want them to suffer for 
the unpopularity of the decision to go to war. 
 The UK’s foreign relations can also have a direct impact on particular ethno-national communities 
and local communities (Briggs, 2010). This was the case for Rwandese groups. All of the Rwandese 
interviewed said that the arrests by the UK authorities and subsequent extradition hearings of the four 
Rwanda men living in the UK, and accused of genocide, had signifi cantly affected them. Some Rwandese 
informants said that the arrests and extradition process had increased community tensions in the UK. 
Others spoke directly about the UK government’s apparent unquestioning support of the current Rwandan 
government and the knock-on effects for Rwandese living in the UK.
 The distinction between local service providers, and national and foreign policy is likely to remain 
blurred. This is an established feature of devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales. The Big Society 
agenda is likely to further blur established distinctions in control of service provision, as local groups are 
increasingly able to manage services, such as free schools. This means that expertise on issues such as 
sensitivity to confl ict, which is currently centralised, will have to be found in different contexts. 
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 We started this report with the example of the death of Imran Farooq, where the local police 
response was to turn the matter over to national authorities with expertise in the factional politics of 
Pakistan. Where similar expertise is required in sectors that are subject to greater devolution (education, 
housing, health, social services) alternatives will have to be found. In some cases there is well-established 
civil society input, such as the Refugee Council’s study packs for schools. In other cases expertise may 
be found locally, through inter-agency working arrangements that are slowly expanding in the form of 
communities of practice. These will be particularly effective if they can also include relevant expertise from 
concerned ethno-national communities. 
 Yet in some cases this combination of existing practices and expertise will simply not be suffi cient. It 
is unlikely that resources will be available to respond to these additional needs in the immediate future. The 
answer will be twofold. First, individuals facing the impacts of confl ict must hold local services to account 
if they are not receiving the services they require. Second, service providers must develop the kind of links 
to local, national and international sources of expertise to enable them to access the necessary information 
they require to respond to local super-diversity. This may be found through developing imaginative links with 
other groups locally, such as RCOs or academics in local universities or through greater awareness of the 
sources of information that already exist in the form of specialist Internet sources. This kind of ‘information 
entrepreneur’ approach must become a key element of delivering local services in a transnational context. 
33Engagement with UK institutions
Defi nitions of community
Community is an extremely fl exible term that is used in different ways by different people for different 
reasons. In classical sociology it originally referred to the tightest-knit, often kinship-based social groups, 
typically tied to a particular place. More recent attention to evolving relationships between globalisation 
and communities has produced a variety of other terms relating to network forms of sociality, though 
place-based local communities remain fundamental. We have considered four forms of community in 
this research: local communities, ethno-national communities, communities of practice and communities 
of choice. Most individuals in the UK belong to all four of these types of community and they frequently 
overlap, though they rarely coincide exactly. 
 Policy approaches have rarely been specifi c about the nature of the community, which is the 
target of any particular policy objective. In some cases, such as ‘community cohesion’, approaches 
encompass both local communities and ethno-national communities. In this report we have sought to 
use consistent terminology and identify to which of these community types we have referred. 
 Clarity is especially important in the context of our study, as confl ict impacts differently on each 
of these four types of community. Confl ict may cause local communities to evolve through the arrival of 
new groups from confl ict areas, as in the case of the Hounslow example. Alternatively, local 
communities with well-established links to confl ict areas, such as the Birmingham neighbourhoods, 
may evolve in different ways – for example, as second- or third-generation migrants from Pakistan 
develop closer affi nities with a more universal Muslim self-understanding, rather than direct associations 
with Pakistan. 
 The two communities of choice considered in this research were both national level campaigns 
provoked by confl ict: the fi rst, to encourage more positive public perceptions of serving soldiers in the 
UK armed forces; and the second to mobilise around the extradition of four men accused of genocide 
to Rwanda. We also examined the evolution of a community of practice in two London boroughs. These 
had developed from links between professionals concerned about the impact of signifi cant numbers of 
UASC from Afghanistan. 
 We identifi ed ethno-national communities as having the most signifi cant overlap with these other 
communities. They represent the most signifi cant source of direct and indirect experience of confl ict in 
most of the other communities considered. Yet ethno-national communities also evolve themselves, in 
response to confl ict. Particular examples considered in this research involved contact between second- 
and third- generation Pakistanis and newly arrived Afghan refugees, but also with working-class white 
army recruits, who all live in the same neighbourhoods in Birmingham. Research identifi ed different 
groups from the Balkans in workplaces in London, where they experience a level of inter-ethnic contact 
that is now much less common in the Balkans. 
 Finally, we considered the contact between Rwandese and Congolese activists encouraged by 
campaigns. Such exchanges can result in the recognition of broader regional identities than those based 
on a more limited ethno-national understanding, and may contribute to the fl exibility produced by 
multiple identities.
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Importance of information quality for policy effectiveness
All communities were concerned about the quality of information on particular confl icts, and this formed 
a second, substantial research fi nding. Confl icts are commonly characterised in the mainstream media 
in overly simplistic terms, based around polarised understandings of confl ict, such as right and wrong, 
abusers and victims, and so forth. Failure to account for the complexity of particular confl icts reduces 
the effectiveness of policy interventions. Such policies may well be resisted by individuals who object to 
classifi cation as part of a victimised community. Where individual communities have a limited history of 
migration to the UK, such as most Balkan ethno-national communities, they may resent the fact that limited 
information about their origins can lead to stereotyping. For example:  
•  either they are characterised as victims, and therefore welcomed to the UK, as in the case of the 
Kosovar Albanians; or
•  they are seen as perpetrators of violence and forced to be careful about revealing their ethno-national 
origins, as in the case of the Serbs.
Sources of information were also challenged by communities of choice. These included the focus of Help 
for Heroes on changing what was perceived as the unfavourable public image of soldiers serving in the 
unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 Findings on information also have implications for service providers. Services must be tailored for 
the needs of individuals arriving from confl ict regions but, as the Hounslow community worker describes, 
this must also be balanced by the needs of the resident local community. The Hounslow solution of 
circulating detailed information on current confl icts to all local service providers is a clear example of good 
practice in this fi eld. The community of practice developed around the arrival of Afghan UASC provides a 
similar example of efforts to ensure that locally signifi cant arrivals do not impact negatively on children’s 
services in the area. 
National policy and responses to overseas confl ict
The fi nal group of fi ndings concerns how the impact of national policy on certain individuals and families 
is changed in contexts of overseas confl ict. Local responses are inevitably framed by national level policy 
decisions. This is likely to be increasingly signifi cant as the Big Society agenda of the current coalition 
Government is implemented, with increased local service provision by civil society organisations. Two of our 
case studies concerned national level campaigns that engaged directly with UK foreign policy and defence 
policy. Yet at local level, national policy decisions mediated the impact of overseas confl ict. In Birmingham, 
for many of the interviewees, the involvement of the UK military in the war in Afghanistan/Pakistan directly 
concerned family projects, such as visits to Pakistan. The resulting changes in security orientation of 
local police forces made many young people feel that they were being unfairly targeted. In Hounslow, the 
impact of confl ict discussed by local community workers occurred more through the arrival of refugees and 
changes in immigration, and asylum policy at the national level inevitably had an impact. 
 The impact of overseas confl ict provides a focus for analysis of communities that avoids an 
immediate ethno-national or religious framing of community. It highlights aspects of these communities 
that may otherwise go unnoticed, leading to confusion about the nature of communities on which a 
particular policy may be focused. The confl ict focus also results in concerns about the nature of circulated 
information, particularly where it is required to inform policy. Finally, confl ict highlights links between national 
and local level policy institutions that are likely to become more important in the future. The fi nal section of 
this report turns to implications for policy and research. 
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There is a lack of conceptual clarity around the use of the term ‘community’ in many policy documents. 
The two most common understandings are local communities and ethno-national communities. Given that 
questions of membership are very different for these two understandings of community, the confusion of 
the two can result in mistakes in targeting particular policies. The recent example of ‘community cohesion’ 
is a case in point. This research has identifi ed the example of local council representatives engaging with 
Afghan migrant community associations as if they were linked to defi ned areas of London, whereas such 
Afghan organisations typically draw on a constituency based on sub-national ethnic groups. Such mistaken 
identifi cations may result in the exclusion of a signifi cant number of Afghans. A clearer focus on the 
differences between different types of community would help to avoid such problems. 
 In addition to local communities and ethno-national communities, this research has also considered 
‘communities of choice’ and ‘communities of practice’, both of which may form in response to overseas 
confl ict. These forms of community are likely to involve civil society responses to particular confl icts. Inter-
agency co-operation is already strongly encouraged by LG Improvement and Development (formerly IDeA), 
and it may be possible for local service providers to learn from, and build on, these ongoing civil society 
initiatives. 
 Those who have experienced confl ict feel its impact most directly. This includes members of the 
armed forces who have experienced active service in confl ict regions and refugees who have come from 
such regions. Such experiences may generate specifi c needs resulting from psychological 
trauma or may simply complicate existing service delivery. Public service providers should be attentive to 
the possible impacts of these confl icts on the ways in which they deliver services. We have identifi ed good 
practice examples where diffusion of information is already standard practice. Such information should 
also assist with the identifi cation of indirect impacts, which are likely to be much more signifi cant and much 
more variable. The identifi cation of particular individuals as being more susceptible to the impact of confl ict 
(i.e. those involved in direct confl ict or in close connection with those who have been) allows local service 
providers to concentrate attention and resources on those most likely to require support.
 Religious institutions fulfi l an important function in dissipating the impact of overseas confl ict. They 
provide a meeting place for individuals of diverse geographic, ethnic, professional and class origins. They 
also provide a valuable support service for individuals struggling with the direct effects of confl ict, allowing 
them to develop valuable bonding social capital beyond the confi nes of their immediate social circles. 
Although religious institutions were not an initial focus of the research, both mosques and churches were 
found to be signifi cant in the communities studied. These fi ndings appear equally valid for institutions of 
other faiths, although involving religious organisations in the provision of services is potentially controversial 
(as the long-standing debates around the religious provision of education suggest). 
 Information is central to responding to effects of confl ict sensitively and effectively. It is not usually 
suffi cient for confl ict responses to arise from standard mainstream media portrayals of the background 
to particular confl icts, though local and national media are an important infl uence on public perceptions of 
confl ict. Therefore, there is a need to develop a database of expertise on confl ict. This could draw signifi cantly 
on existing sources of information, such as the Home Offi ce’s Country of Origin Information reports (RDS, 
2010) which provide detailed background and further sources to confl ict for the purposes of assessing asylum 
claims. It would also build on existing local initiatives, such as the system that Hounslow council already has in 
place, circulating details of implications of the dynamic of confl ict situations. 
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7 Policy implications 
 Communities of practice provide a much more engaged means of information sharing and delivery 
than agency specifi c ways of working. Although such communities of practice are well established in 
commercial and international fi elds, in local government they are a relatively new area, in which work could 
be developed further. They have been actively promoted by LG Improvement and Development since 2007, 
and the associated capacity skills training is a particularly cost-effective way of encouraging inter-agency 
working. The kinds of informal, regular, inter-agency contacts encouraged by such networking do not only 
improve the circulation of relevant information but also often lead to enhanced understanding of the variety 
of roles involved.
 Finally, attention to the impacts of overseas confl ict requires close connections between local 
service providers and national and foreign policies. As distinctions between local service provider and 
national and foreign policies become increasingly blurred, this research has identifi ed a need to clarify the 
changing functions of policy-making at national and local level. Attention to overseas confl ict inevitably 
involves a combination of national government and local authority decision-making. When the coalition 
government decentralises authority under its Big Society agenda, decision-making and direct participation 
at local authority or civil society level will increase. As this happens, it is vital that the necessary expertise be 
made available to implementing actors. 
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1  This term refers to groups defi ned according to ethnic or national origin. It is similar to the commonly 
used term ‘black and minority ethnic’ (BME) communities but differs in two ways: fi rst, it includes 
national groups that are not commonly considered either ‘black’ or ‘ethnic’, such as Poles or Algerians; 
second, it also includes ‘majority’ communities, such as the census category ‘white British’.
2 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers of this research for highlighting this.
3 Referred to throughout this document simply as ‘the Balkans’.
4  It is very diffi cult to estimate the number of people involved in the Combattants. Its leader (cited in Allen, 
2008) claims it has 4,000 members but most of the individuals from Congolese civil society interviewed 
for this research did not think it was anywhere near so signifi cant. The many videos posted online 
show no more than a few dozen people involved in their regular protests outside the DRC embassy. 
Nevertheless, they are infl uential and even accused of infl uencing Papa Wemba’s decision not to 
perform at Nelson Mandela’s 90th birthday concert.
5  Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2009) ‘The UK’s Mission in Afghanistan’, House of Commons, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/302/30209.htm (accessed 
1 June 2010).
6 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Asia-South/Pakistan/ (accessed 1 June 2010).
7  Calculated from Home Offi ce asylum statistics, available from; 
http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/immigration-asylum-stats.html (accessed 1 June 2010).
8 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-Eastern–Southern/Uganda/ (accessed 1 June 2010).
9  http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-West–Central/Rwanda/ (accessed 1 June 2010).
10  http://ukinrwanda.fco.gov.uk/en/ (accessed 1 June 2010).
11   http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-West–Central/Congo-Democratic-Republic/ 
(accessed 1 June 2010).
12  http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-West–Central/Burundi/ (accessed 1 June 2010).
13  http://www.appggreatlakes.org/ (accessed 1 June 2010).
14  See Global Witness reports (2009 and 2010) and 2009 UN Experts report on DRC.
15   PSC–Parliamentary Select Committee (2000) London: UK Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, fourth report, prepared 7 June 2000.
16 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Europe/Bosnia-Herzegovina (accessed 1 June 2010).
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17 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/where-we-work/europe/kosovo (accessed 1 June 2010).
18 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Europe/Serbia (accessed 1 June 2010).
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Appendix
Three mapping exercises
To provide a basis for further analysis and selection of a particular area of focus, we mapped the various 
links between the confl icts and the UK, in terms of material and immaterial connections. Links were 
mapped for each confl ict region across the following areas:
• UK foreign, aid and military policy towards the region;
• parliamentary links with the region;
• UK-based NGOs working on the region;
• UK-based research centres and academics working on the region;
• commercial interests and business linkages with the region;
• migration to the UK from the region;
• diaspora engagement in politics and development in the region; and
• diaspora involvement in community groups/projects with a UK focus.
The results of the mapping exercises are summarised below.
Afghanistan/Pakistan
The UK has had a long and signifi cant role in the confl icts in Afghanistan and Pakistan dating back to the 
nineteenth century. This has included drawing up the contested borders in the region and supporting 
the Mujahadeen against the Soviet invasion and Soviet-supported government in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Following the 9/11 attacks, the UK engaged militarily in Afghanistan alongside coalition forces, led by the 
US in Operation Enduring Freedom. In March 2006, UK troops deployed to Helmand Province as part of 
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and, since this date, have been part of a 16-nation 
counter-insurgency force in southern Afghanistan.
 The UK’s contribution to the international intervention in Afghanistan has been signifi cant. It is the 
second biggest troop contributor in Afghanistan with nearly 9,000 troops and, as of 10 September 2010, 
some 335 British service personnel have lost their lives in Afghanistan since 2001. The UK’s fi nancial 
contribution has also been high: the cost of UK military operations in Afghanistan increased from £750 
million in 2006–07 to £1.5 billion in 2007–08, and to £2.6 billion in 2008–09. At the same time, development 
and stabilisation spending increased from £154 million in 2006–07, to £166 million in 2007–08, and to 
£207 million in 2008–09, making the UK Afghanistan’s third biggest donor, behind the US and the Asian 
Development Bank.5 The Department for International Development (DFID) recently committed £510 million 
in additional aid to Afghanistan for 2009–13 to support governance, economic growth, security and stability 
and alternatives to poppy growing. 
 The UK also has a long and signifi cant diplomatic and aid relationship with its former colony 
Pakistan, announcing a doubling of aid to Pakistan to £480 million per year in 2011 through bilateral and 
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multi-lateral channels (in 2008–09, bilateral aid was £120 million).6 UK parliamentary interest in the region 
remains high via the Associate Parliamentary Group for Afghanistan, the All Party Parliamentary Groups for 
Pakistan and Kashmir and the efforts of individual MPs and peers. There are a signifi cant number of UK-
based international NGOs working in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with work in Afghanistan coordinated by 
the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan 
Relief. A number of British academics and research centres (e.g. Bradford) have become intensely involved 
in analysis of the confl ict as well as (sometimes controversial) research into ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ 
among British Muslims. There are long-standing business links between Pakistan and the UK and, more 
recently, there has been a growth in engagement by British security and risk management fi rms in the 
region, securing contracts to protect commercial, diplomatic, aid and military personnel in Afghanistan – in 
some cases coming under criticism for violence and corruption.
 The current Pakistani and Afghan governments are key partners in the US and UK international ‘War 
on Terror’. As a result of UK involvement in the international military interventions in Afghanistan (and Iraq), 
the UK has become a more signifi cant target for Islamist terrorist groups, who attacked London in July 
2005. It is estimated that three-quarters of terror plots against targets in the UK emanate from the porous 
border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a result, new anti-terrorism legislation has been passed 
in the UK creating a signifi cant clampdown of civil liberties. 
 In terms of communities in the UK, there is a long history of settlement of Pakistanis in Britain dating 
back to partition and encompassing the expulsion of East African Asians in the 1970s, many of whom 
were of Pakistani origin. From the 1970s, approximately 10,000 Pakistanis have gained entry into the UK 
as part of migration for marriage and family reunifi cation provisions. Today, there are second- and third-
generation individuals of Pakistani origin in the UK, so census fi gures (Table 1) do not accurately capture 
the numbers of people of Pakistani heritage in the UK. A few hundred Afghans are thought to have settled 
in the UK prior to the 1980s. Their number increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s as Afghans fl ed 
the Soviet occupation, subsequent civil war and rise of the Taliban. From the mid-1990s, the numbers 
of Afghan asylum seekers increased as a result of Taliban repression and then the war that followed the 
NATO invasion in 2001. A growing proportion of Afghan asylum seekers are children – Home Offi ce fi gures 
suggest that in 2008, 50 per cent of Afghan asylum applicants were children,7 and there are an estimated 
4,200 unaccompanied minors from Afghanistan in Britain (Kellaway, 2010), most being supported by local 
authority social services. In recent years, the UK government has tried to encourage returns to Afghanistan 
of both failed asylum seekers and refuges and the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) has helped 
repatriate around 2,000 Afghans.
Country Main arrival dates
Estimated 
population
Main areas of residence
Afghanistan
•  Small numbers in 
1980s/early 1990s
• 1994–2001
• 2001–
15,000–40,000
Greater London:
Especially west and north-west London 
Outside London:
Birmingham, other major cities
Pakistan
• 1950s–1960s
•  1970s (expulsion 
from East Africa)
•  Smaller numbers 
(10,000 pa) from 1970s 
750,000+
(2001 census 
fi gure)
Greater London:
Especially west and north London
Outside London:
West and East Midlands, Yorkshire, 
Lancashire, but also increasingly disperse 
populations throughout the UK
Table 1: Afghanistan and Pakistani refugee and migrant groups in the UK
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 In terms of diaspora activities linked to the confl ict region, there are a large number of Afghan-run 
community organisations in London: active ones include the Afghan Association Paiwand, the Afghan 
Association of London, the Afghan and Central Asian Association, and the Afghan Students’ Association 
in the UK. These organisations offer a range of educational, cultural and social services to refugees 
and migrants and opportunities for networking and information exchange. There are also a number of 
transnational NGOs that have focused specifi cally on development and peace-building in Afghanistan (e.g. 
SERVE Afghanistan, Afghan Action). There are also tens of well-established Pakistani-run organisations 
focused both on development activities in Pakistan, as well as support and services for the UK Pakistani 
community. In recent decades, the UK has served as an important base for the political opposition, with 
fi gures such as General Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto and Imran Khan based in the UK for periods.
 Afghan and Pakistani communities in the UK have felt signifi cant and sometimes contradictory 
effects of the confl icts in their region of origin. They have become prominent in the public eye and feel under 
intense surveillance by the British authorities. They are the subject of increased racist attacks and have 
often been portrayed as a security threat or suspect community. In some cases, this has prompted them to 
join up with other UK residents in organisations such as the Campaign against Criminalising Communities. 
More broadly, the Afghan confl ict has led to signifi cant engagement by other UK residents in a variety of 
campaigns to seek to stop the confl ict (e.g. the Stop the War Coalition, formed in September 2001), secure 
the release of UK prisoners from Guantanamo Bay and seek justice for the victims or torture related to the 
confl ict and breaches of civil liberties in the UK.
 The fi erce, ongoing fi ghting in Afghanistan has also had a dramatic impact on the British military, 
which is said to be overstretched and under-resourced. The rate of casualties has been high and the 
psychological and physical wounds borne by many veterans have been devastating for many UK 
individuals, families and communities. This has led to the establishment of a range of organisations working 
to support British armed forces, soldiers, veterans and bereaved families – for example, Afghan Heroes, 
Help for Heroes and Combat Stress – and the involvement of entire communities such as that in Wootton 
Bassett in Wiltshire, which turns out in large numbers each time hearses of soldiers killed in Afghanistan 
pass through the town.
Great Lakes region
The UK’s longest relationship with the Great Lakes region is with its former colony Uganda. Since 1986, 
when the current President Museveni’s National Resistance Movement took power, the UK has given 
signifi cant political support and development aid to Uganda (£71.1 million in 2008–09),8 which has 
been viewed as one of the more successful African countries. The UK’s relationship with the other three 
(francophone) countries of the region developed in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when the 
UK gave signifi cant humanitarian aid to the Rwandan refugee camps in Eastern Zaïre (now DRC) and then 
established an aid programme in Rwanda, which has grown to one of its most signifi cant in Africa (£70.1 
million in 2008–09).9 
 Over the last decade, UK government policy has emphasised that the stability of the Great 
Lakes region is important to the security and development of Africa as a whole.10 It established a major 
bilateral aid programme in DRC in 2003 (£93.9 million in 2008–09)11 and a smaller programme 
in Burundi (£10.4 million in 2008–09).12 Today, the UK is one on the largest bilateral donors to Uganda, 
Rwanda and the DRC. It operates in the context of wider international efforts to reduce confl ict and 
promote post-confl ict transition in the region, which include the ongoing UN peacekeeping operation 
in DRC (MONUC), AFRICOM efforts to bring peace to Northern Uganda, International Criminal Court 
investigations and indictments in both Uganda and DRC and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR).
 UK interest in the region is also demonstrated by the establishment of the All-Party Parliamentary 
Group on the Great Lakes Region of Africa, which produces reports on the region, lobbies ministers, 
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and provides a channel for NGOs and academics to submit their analysis.13 There has been a growth 
of engagement by UK-based INGOs in the region (e.g. Oxfam, Save the Children, Christian Aid, CARE) 
in a range of areas including humanitarian relief, education, health, gender equality, child protection, 
governance, human rights, confl ict prevention and peace-building. There has also been a signifi cant growth 
in UK-based academics working on the region and some increased interest from British media, although 
largely focused on Rwanda and Uganda. Over the last decade, many hundreds of UK citizens have also 
become involved in charitable and other work related to Rwanda, in addition to longer standing work by UK 
citizens related to Uganda.
 In terms of UK commercial interests, the UK is a signifi cant trading partner of Uganda, exporting 
£50 million of goods to Uganda in 2008 and being among Uganda’s top ten sources of imports. The UK is 
also a leading investor in Uganda. Other commercial interests in the region are mainly related to the role of 
UK companies in mineral extraction in the DRC, which have been controversial because a number of UK 
companies have been accused of breaching UN sanctions.14
 In terms of communities in the UK, several waves of refugees have arrived in the UK from the region, 
many of which have been given asylum (see Table 2). The Ugandan community has been established the 
Country Main arrival dates
Estimated 
population
Main areas of residence
DRC
• Late 1980s/early 1990s
• Late 1990s–2003/04
•  Smaller numbers 
ongoing
20,000–40,000
Greater London:
Haringey, Newham, Redbridge, Islington, 
Hackney, Barking and Croydon, Camden
Outside London:
Birmingham, Glasgow, Hull
Uganda
• 1966
• 1971–79
• 1985–86
• Late 1980s
180,000–
350,000
Greater London:
Forest Gate, Mitcham (highest 
concentration), Lambeth, fairly well 
distributed around London
Outside London:
Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, 
Surrey, Sheffi eld, Luton, Milton Keynes, 
Coventry, Leeds, Nottingham, Oxford
Rwanda
• Mid- to late 1990s
•  Smaller numbers 
ongoing since 2001
3,000–10,000
Greater London:
The Rwandese Community is fairly 
well dispersed throughout southern 
and eastern London and has no 
specifi c area of concentration
Outside London:
Coventry, Birmingham, 
Manchester, Oxford
Burundi
•  Small numbers 
since late 1990s
Fewer than 
1,000
Greater London:
The Burundian Community is fairly 
well dispersed throughout southern 
and eastern London and has no 
specifi c area of concentration
Table 2: Great Lakes refugee and migrant groups in the UK
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longest with refugees (and some migrants) arriving since the 1960s. Thus, there are now fi rst- and second-
generation people of Ugandan heritage in the UK. The fi rst and largest wave of refugees from Rwanda 
arrived as a result of the 1994 genocide, but several thousand Rwandans have come since then. The 
majority of Congolese refugees started to arrive in the UK from the late 1990s and there are still several 
hundred asylum applications every month. The Burundian community in the UK is smallest, with only an 
estimated few hundred Burundians arriving in the UK since the late 1990s. The majority of UK residents 
from the region live in London and the Midlands.
 Migrants and refugees from the region living in the UK have set up a variety of civil society 
organisations including community organisations, survivor groups, women’s groups, youth groups, 
business associations, advocacy groups and religious groups. Some organisations are focused on 
bringing about peace, development and/or political change in the region. For example, through 
supporting genocide education and commemoration projects (e.g. Aegis Trust Rwanda); funding 
community-level projects (e.g. Rwanda Youth Information Community Organisation, Hope 4 Children 
Uganda); supporting business linkages (e.g. Uganda Business and Professionals Association); or trying 
to lobby for political change in the region and a change in UK policy (e.g. Platform of Congolese Women 
in the UK). 
 Other organisations have focused their energies on supporting refugees in the UK, whether through 
providing opportunities for social networking and cultural events (e.g. Rwanda Community Association 
UK), providing news and information (e.g. Londres Na Biso weekly Congolese magazine), or assisting 
refugees and asylum seekers (e.g. CORECOG) or genocide survivors (e.g. Hope Survivors Foundation). 
Some organisations also focus on raising awareness amongst the wider British public about the region (e.g. 
Aegis Trust, Congo Now). Whilst refugees have set up the majority of the organisations in the UK, some 
organisations have been established by or with considerable support of other UK citizens (e.g. Rwanda 
United Kingdom Goodwill Organisation and Rwanda Aid).
 In the cases of Rwanda, DRC, and to a lesser extent Uganda, there is signifi cant political opposition 
based within the international diaspora – including in the UK. For example, London is often termed the 
headquarters of Congolese political opposition overseas. All the governments in the region – but most 
notably the Rwandese government – have made signifi cant efforts to engage the diaspora in the UK in 
development activities in Rwanda, although this has been viewed as surveillance by some members of the 
Rwandan community in the UK. Another key linkage between the region and the UK has been the pursuit 
of genocide suspects and suspected war criminals in the UK. In 2000, the UK extradited one Rwandan 
genocide suspect to the ICTR in Tanzania and in 2006, arrested four Rwandan genocide suspects in the 
UK and attempted to extradite them to Rwanda. This caused and increase in fear and tension within an 
already divided Rwandan community in the UK.
The Balkans
Given the position of the Balkans on the edge of Europe, the UK has had a longstanding diplomatic 
relationship with the region, particularly with the FY. At the onset of the war in Bosnia in 1992, and largely
in response to pressure from the Serbian lobby in the UK, the UK government took a ‘neutral’ stance 
towards the events, promising to deliver humanitarian aid, but not to intervene otherwise. On the other 
hand, many political leaders at the time, especially those in the UK, naively considered Miloševic´ as 
the corner of stability in the Balkans. Despite UK resistance, EU and US allies continued to push for 
international intervention and in 1995, NATO intervened by bombing targets in Bosnia which eventually 
helped bring the confl ict to an end. The UK engagement had been high throughout the confl ict, albeit in an 
(arguably) obstructive way. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in December 1995, a new leaf 
was turned – the UK played a key role on the Peace Implementation Council and contributed British troops 
to the NATO-led international peace-keeping forces – the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the subsequent 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and European Union Military Force (EUFOR). Dame Pauline Neville-Jones was 
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a key negotiator at Dayton, while the former Liberal Democrat leader Lord Paddy Ashdown served as High 
Representative for BiH during 2002–06. The presence of UK troops gradually reduced, and in 2007 the last 
British Battalion left Banja Luka.
 Partly due to its guilt over its role in resisting early international intervention in Bosnia, the UK took a 
much more proactive stance as the Kosovo crisis deepened in 1998. The UK government led many of the 
diplomatic initiatives to negotiate peace and then actively supported and participated in the three-month 
NATO bombing campaign of Serbian and Kosovan targets in 1999, which brought the confl ict to an end. 
In total, it is estimated that the UK contributed 960 million euros in response to the Kosovo crisis, including 
through its troop contributions to NATO- and UN-led peace-keeping and stabilisation forces, its diplomatic 
efforts and its contributions to humanitarian reconstruction in 1999–2000.15
 In the aftermath of the Balkans confl icts, the UK established aid programmes in the region to 
contribute to reconstruction and development. Between 1992 and 2008, UK bilateral aid to BiH totalled 
£80 million,16 but UK development assistance has gradually reduced and DFID will close its aid programme 
in BiH in 2011. The UK established an aid programme in Kosovo in 1999 focused on emergency assistance 
and then governance. In 2008–09, the total UK bilateral aid to Kosovo was £17.7 million and, for the time 
being, the UK has committed to continue its aid programme in Kosovo.17 The UK has also given smaller 
amounts of aid to Serbia in the aftermath of the confl ict, focused mainly in the area of governance, and 
amounting to £2.9 million in 2008–09.18 
Country Main arrival dates
Estimated 
population
Main areas of residence
BiH
• 1992–95
•  Smaller numbers 
since 1995
8,000–10,000
Greater London:
Brent, Hounslow, Hammersmith
Outside London:
Birmingham, Derby, Coventry, Desbury
Kosovo
(Kosovar 
Albanians)
•  Small numbers 
through 1990s
• 1999
•  Small numbers 
since 2000
50,000 (rough 
estimate)
Greater London:
North-west (Kilburn/Swiss Cottage/West 
Hampstead and Finchley Road), west 
(Hounslow) and north-east (Haringey)
Outside London:
Birmingham, Manchester, Yorkshire
Serbia
• 1947–50
• 1980
• Mid- to late 1990s
•  Smaller numbers 
since late 1990s
70,000
Greater London:
West (Hammersmith and Fulham, 
Shepherd’s Bush, Acton), 
Camden, Westminster
Outside London:
Midlands, Yorkshire, Lancashire, 
Bradford, Oxford
Croatia
•  Very small numbers 
since 1970s
7,500
Greater London:
Mainly longer-settled and dispersed 
migrants rather than refugees
All (Roma)
•  Smaller numbers 
throughout 1990s 
and 2000s
Not known
Location also not known precisely but 
a number of them live in London
Table 3: Balkans refugee and migrant groups in the UK
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 Increased UK engagement in the Balkans since the 1990s is also refl ected through the engagement 
of British MPs, both via the All Party Parliamentary Bosnia Group, Friends of Kosovo Group, Group on 
Serbia and Group on Croatia and through individual links. A range of UK-based international NGOs have 
signifi cant programme in the Balkans (e.g. Oxfam, Christian Aid, Save the Children, World Vision) and several 
universities have established research programmes on the region (e.g. London School of Economics, 
University College London and Bradford). Many other UK citizens have also engaged with the region, for 
example through student groups and charitable work. In terms of commercial connections, there were 
traditionally well-established business linkages between the UK and Serbia, which have been revived with 
a number of UK-based companies having offi ces in Serbia and a steady increase of UK exports to Serbia. 
The UK also exports to Croatia and BiH, but is not a main trading partner of any of the Balkans nations.
 In terms of migrants and refugees from the Balkans in the UK, the Serbian community is the 
longest established in the UK, with steady numbers of Serbians arriving here from the end of 1945. This 
was due mainly to those fl eeing the rise to power of the Communists, as well as to professionals coming 
to the UK to study and progress their careers – especially in the 1980s. The 1992–95 and 1998–99 wars 
in BiH and Kosovo triggered the arrival of Bosniacs, Kosovar Albanians, Roma (and some Serbs) in the 
UK, both as independent asylum seekers and through UNHCR’s Government 1000 programme, which 
brought survivors of concentration camps and those in refugee camps to the UK. Most were eventually 
granted exceptional or indefi nite leave to remain (ELR, and ILR, respectively) or full refugee status, including 
through the Asylum Amnesty announced by the British Government in 2003. On the whole refugees from 
the region, especially Kosovar Albanians, have been met with sympathy by the British media and public, 
and their resettlement and integration in the UK is considered quite successful. Several thousand refugees 
from the Balkans have also returned to the region, with the assistance of the International Organization of 
Migration (IOM).
 Migrants and refugees living in the UK have set up a variety of civil society organisations, including 
community organisations, business associations, and advocacy groups. Some organisations are focused 
on bringing about peace and development in the Balkans region through funding community projects, 
supporting business linkages and engaging in political advocacy (e.g. Bosnia Appeal). There have also 
been efforts by all these countries’ governments to engage their diaspora in development in the region. 
The BiH World Diaspora was formally set up in 2001 and has its headquarters in Birmingham. Other 
organisations have focused their energies on supporting refugees in the UK. For example, we identifi ed 
around 30 BiH community organisations in the UK, over a dozen Kosovar Albanian/Albanian organisations 
and dozens of Serbian organisations. These organisations variously focus on providing welfare, educational 
and cultural services (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina Community Advice Centres, Albanian Youth Action) 
and opportunities for social networking (e.g. Croatian Students and Young Professionals Network) and 
information exchange (e.g. Britic – the British Serbian Magazine). Some of the bigger organisations have 
activities focused both in the UK and on the Balkans region (e.g. Serbian Society or Serbian City Club).
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